The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie by Stephens, Beth
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 66 Issue 2 Article 6 
1997 
The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal 
Law After Erie 
Beth Stephens 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 Fordham 
L. Rev. 393 (1997). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol66/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie 
Cover Page Footnote 
Visiting Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden. J.D., University of California, 
Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1980: B.A., Harvard University, 1976. Thanks to David Bederman, Roger Clark, Martin 
Flaherty, Jules Lobel, and Allan Stein for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article, and to my 
reserach assistants, Julie Wood, Rutgers-Camden '97, Vincent Nolan, Rutgers-Camden '98, and Elizabeth 
Guianeri, Rutgers-Camden '98. My appreciation as well to the MacArthur Foundation for the grant that 
initially enabled me to pursue concerns reflected in this article. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol66/iss2/6 
THE LAW OF OUR LAND:
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
FEDERAL LAW AFTER ERIE
Beth Stephens*
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
their determination.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
F OR decades, federal courts have cited this famous language for
the proposition that customary international law is part of federal
common law,' the body of unwritten rules of decision developed by
federal courts in the absence of a direct constitutional or statutory
provision.2 If international law is part of federal law, it provides the
* Visiting Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden. J.D.,
University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1980; B.A., Harvard University, 1976.
Thanks to David Bederman, Roger Clark, Martin Flaherty, Jules Lobel, and Allan
Stein for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article, and to my research as-
sistants, Julie Wood, Rutgers-Camden '97, Vincent Nolan, Rutgers-Camden '98, and
Elizabeth Guianeri, Rutgers-Camden '98. My appreciation as well to the MacArthur
Foundation for the grant that initially enabled me to pursue the concerns reflected in
this article.
1. Several Supreme Court and circuit court cases cite The Paquete Habana in this
manner. E.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comerico Exterior de Cuba, 462
U.S. 611, 623 (1983) ("[A]s we have frequently reiterated, [international law] 'is part
of our law....'); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,763
(1972) (plurality opinion) (noting that international law is one of several applicable
sources of law in federal court); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
423 (1964) ("United States courts apply international law as a part of our own . . .");
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907) (applying international law as part of fed-
eral common law governing relations among states): Galo-Garcia v. INS, 86 F.3d 916,
918 (9th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995): Princz v. Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174-75 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1994); In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation (Hilao v. Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1473-74
(9th Cir. 1994); Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1447 (5th Cir.
1993); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos (Trajano v. Marcos), 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th
Cir. 1992); Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.2d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 1991); Committee of
United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986); Demjanjuk v. Pe-
trovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985); Filtrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d
Cir. 1980); Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.2d 475, 479 n.7 (2d Cir. 1972); cf Skiri-
otes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73 (1941) (ambiguously citing to The Paqueie Habana
for the proposition that "[i]ntemational law is part of our law and as such is the law of
all States of the Union.").
2. "The phrase federal common law refers to the development of legally binding
federal law by the federal courts in the absence of directly controlling constitutional
or statutory provisions." Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 331 (2d ed. 1994).
Professor Kramer offers a broad definition: "[T~he common law includes any rule
articulated by a court that is not easily found on the face of an applicable statute."
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basis for federal court jurisdiction over cases raising well-pleaded in-
ternational law claims.' Moreover, if international law is part of fed-
eral law, it is the law of land, binding on the states pursuant to the
supremacy clause;4 and state courts are bound to follow federal court
decisions as to its meaning.5 This view of customary international law
as federal common law, recently labeled the "modern position,'" 6 has
been widely accepted.7
Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 Pace L. Rev. 263, 267
(1992).
3. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (holding that statutory federal
question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, "will support claims founded upon federal
common law as well as those of a statutory origin").
4. The supremacy clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. Const. art. VI.
5. Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of Inter-
national Law, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 295, 303 ("When state and federal law conflict, it
does not matter.., what sort of federal law is at issue; whether it is executive, legisla-
tive, or judicial. All federal law trumps all state law. If international law enjoys that
elevated status, it will also prevail."); Alfred Hill, The Law-making Power of the Fed-
eral Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1024, 1073-79 (1967) (argu-
ing that federal judge-made law is binding on the states through the supremacy
clause).
6. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Fed-
eral Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 816
(1997).
7. Id. at 817 ("The modern position ... has the overwhelming approval of the
academy."); see also Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations,
104 Yale L.J. 39, 40 (1994) ("Although commentators continue to debate the extent of
executive, legislative, or judicial power to trump customary international law, the im-
port of The Paquete Habana is clear: Customary international law informs the con-
struction of domestic law, and, at least in the absence of any superseding positive law,
is controlling."); see, e.g., Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Fildr-
tiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), 19 I.L.M. 585, 606 n.49
(1980) ("Customary international law is federal law, to be enunciated authoritatively
by federal courts. An action for tort under international law is therefore a case 'aris-
ing under ... the laws of the United States' within Article III of the Constitution."
(citing, inter alia, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900))); Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 102, 111, 115 (1987)
[hereinafter Restatement (Third)] (stating that international law, including customary
international law, is federal law, supreme over state law and triggering federal court
jurisdiction); Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over Inter-
national Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filhrtiga v. Pefia-
Irala, 22 Harv. Int'l L.J. 53, 57, 98-102 (1981); Louis Henkin, International Law as
Law in the United States, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1555, 1560-62 (1984); Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 Yale L.J. 2347, 2385-86 (1991); Kenneth C.
Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 349,
388-93 (1988).
Several federal circuit courts have so held, including the Second Circuit in Fildrtiga
v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), an international human rights case holding
that "the law of nations ... has always been part of the federal common law." Id. at
[Vol. 66
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But the conclusion that the Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana
and similar cases8 referred to federal law has come under attack from
commentators who argue that these courts and scholars have ignored
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins9 and the dramatic change it wrought in
the federal courts' lawmaking powers.10 At the time of the Paquete
Habana decision, the federal courts still followed the now-discredited
approach of Swift v. Tyson," applying federal court interpretations of
the general common law to cases that would now be governed by state
law.12 What if, when the Supreme Court said "[i]nternational law is
part of our law,"' 3 the Court meant that international law was a part
of this general common law? Does the language of The Paquete Ha-
bana, read in light of Erie's decisive rejection of the general common
law, signify that international law is state law? If international law is
part of state law, not federal law, the federal courts can neither use it
as a basis for federal question jurisdiction nor impose their interpreta-
tions of international law on the states pursuant to the supremacy
clause.
If the Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana was referring to the
general common law, not federal law, is it possible that the judicial
and scholarly claim that customary international law is federal com-
mon law is a sham, based upon a willful misreading of eighteenth and
nineteenth century texts? Is the modern position no more than a
strutting emperor, whose lack of clothes is rightfully exposed by schol-
ars unencumbered by habits of deference or by the wish-fulfilling de-
885; see also In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation (Hilao v. Marcos), 25
F.3d 1467, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation
(Trajano v. Marcos), 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) ("It is also well settled that the
law of nations is part of federal common law." (citing The Paquete Habana)).
8. See, e.g., The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388,423, 9 Cranch 242,263 (1815) ("[T]he court
is bound by the law of nations, which is a part of the law of the land."); Ware v.
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) ("When the United States declared their inde-
pendence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modem state of purity
and refinement."); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 474, 2 Dall. 333, 407 (1793)
("[T]he United States had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth, become
amenable to the laws of nations; and it was their interest, as well as their duty, to
provide, that those laws should be respected and obeyed ... .
9. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6; see also A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Fed-
eral Courts, and International Cases, 20 Yale J. Int'l L. 1, 38-44 (1995).
11. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
12. Under the Swift v. Tyson regime, state court decisions interpreting issues of
general common law were not binding on federal courts hearing cases based on diver-
sity jurisdiction. Id at 18-19; see discussion infra notes 143-66 and accompanying text.
As used in this article, "general common law" refers to the body of law developed
by the federal courts under Swift v. Tyson and applied to areas otherwise governed by
state law. Although there was some disagreement as to whether it was state or fed-
eral law, general common law was neither jurisdiction-granting nor supreme over
state law. "Federal common law" in this article refers to common law developed by
the federal courts that is both jurisdiction-granting and supreme-about which there
is no doubt as to its federal law status.
13. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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sire to incorporate international law into the U.S. legal system? This,
indeed, is the position taken by Professors Bradley and Goldsmith in a
recent article in which they lambast courts and scholars alike for rely-
ing on "mistaken interpretations of history, doctrinal bootstrapping
... and academic fiat" 4 to conclude that customary international law
constitutes federal common law, a position that they consider "in ten-
sion with some of our nation's most fundamental constitutional
principles."15
This fundamental question of constitutional and international law-
the status of customary international law in our legal structure-is
open to debate because of the Constitution's failure to provide a di-
rect answer. The supremacy clause states that treaties "shall be the
supreme Law of the Land," binding on all states.16 International law,
however, includes both formal agreements, such as treaties, and cus-
tomary law, which consists of unwritten rules accepted as legally bind-
ing by all or part of the international community. 7 The supremacy
clause makes no mention of the unwritten international law that has
played a major role in international affairs for centuries. 8
Exploiting this constitutional lacuna, Bradley and Goldsmith con-
struct an argument that is deceptively simple. They start with the
assumption that, before Erie, customary international law was consid-
ered part of the general common law.19 Since Erie rejected the entire
notion of such a body of law, they reason, no cases discussing the sta-
14. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 821.
15. Id. at 873. International law professors receive most of the blame in Bradley
and Goldsmith's narrative. Id. at 874-76. They note that most judges are unfamiliar
with international law and thus are "heavily influenced by academic sources" in this
area. Id. at 875.
16. U.S. Const. art. VI; see supra note 5.
17. Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 102(1) (listing three sources of interna-
tional law: customary law, international agreement, and general principles common
to the major legal systems). As defined by the Restatement (Third), "Customary in-
ternational law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation." Id. § 102(2).
18. Customary international law has dominated international relations until this
century and continues to occupy an important role to this day.
Until recently, international law was essentially customary law: agreements
made particular arrangements between particular parties, but were not ordi-
narily used for general law-making for states. In our day, treaties have be-
come the principal vehicle for making law for the international system; more
and more of established customary law is being codified by general agree-
ments. To this day, however, many rules about status, property, and interna-
tional delicts are still customary law, not yet codified.
Restatement (Third), supra note 7, part I, ch. 1, introductory note, at 18. The basic
rules that bind nations to obey their international agreements are rooted in customary
international law, id., as are, for example, key aspects of the law of the sea. See infra
note 308; see also Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution 232 (2d ed.
1996) ("Even now, in our third century under the Constitution and after a century of
radical change in the international legal system, most of the international rights and
obligations of the United States lie in unwritten, customary, international law.").
19. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 823-24.
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tus of international law decided before Erie are of any precedential
value today."0 Bradley and Goldsmith conclude that, after Erie, in the
absence of direct authorization from the executive or legislative
branches of government, federal courts have neither jurisdiction based
on international law nor power to impose federal interpretations of
international law on the states.1
Such a simplified view, however, overlooks the rich and complex
role international law has played in our legal system for over two hun-
dred years. Indeed, the suggestion that Erie tossed the law of nations
out of federal court along with the general common law rests on sev-
eral misconceptions. First, the intent of the framers, incorporated into
the Constitution, was to ensure respect for international law by as-
signing responsibility for enforcement of that law to the three
branches of the federal government, including the judiciary, as well as
the executive and legislative branches. The federal courts imple-
mented this responsibility in part by interpreting and applying custom-
ary international law. Second, during the tangled reign of the general
common law regime, the federal courts recognized the need for a true
federal common law and began to develop such law. Although the
role of international law was often unclear, it was not subsumed into
the general common law. Thus, while Erie rejected the general com-
mon law, it upheld the federal courts' power to develop common law
in areas properly governed by federal law, including international law.
Finally, the rejection of international law as a form of federal law pre-
supposes a quite radical view of state jurisdiction, implying that state
courts can make independent determinations as to the content of in-
ternational law and decide whether or not to obey otherwise valid,
binding rules of international law.
This article offers a defense of the historical antecedents and cur-
rent validity of the core of the "modern position." It argues that the
determination of the content of customary international law and of
whether or not it applies in a given situation is a federal question,
which triggers federal court jurisdiction and on which federal court
decisions are binding on the states.
This core position, emphasizing the federal status of customary in-
ternational law, need not engage the ongoing debate about the place
of customary international law in the hierarchy of federal law: Is cus-
tomary international law subordinate to the Constitution, treaties,
congressional enactments and/or executive decrees, or supreme over
one or more of these?' The Supreme Court has held that treaties are
20. Id. at 853.
21. Id. at 870-71.
22. The literature on this question is extensive. See, e.g., Agora: May the President
Violate Customary International Law?, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 913 (1986) (presenting an
exchange of views on the topic); Jack M. Goldklang, Back on Board the Paquete Ha-
bana: Resolving the Conflict Between Statutes and Customary International Law, 25
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of equal stature as statutes-the last in time governs over prior incon-
sistent provisions-but inferior to the Constitution. 3 The Court has
never directly decided the place of customary international law in the
hierarchy. The Paquete Habana and other decisions, however, imply
that both statutes and executive actions override inconsistent custom-
ary law, and this has been the holding of all modern court decisions. 4
This article will accept these limitations, arguing only the federal sta-
tus of customary international law. 5
To understand the modern status of customary international law
and the significance of current citations to cases such as The Paquete
Habana, part I explores the concept of international law current in the
late eighteenth century and the manner in which such basic beliefs
Va. J. Int'l L. 143, 147 (1984) (concluding that statutes override inconsistent custom-
ary international law); Henkin, supra note 7, at 1566-69 (arguing that customary inter-
national law is "equal in authority to an act of Congress," but that, in some
circumstances, the President is authorized to disregard such law); Jules Lobel, The
Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International
Law, 71 Va. L. Rev. 1071, 1130-53 (1985) (arguing that fundamental international law
norms bind both Congress and the President).
The Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 115(1) states that statutes override prior
inconsistent rules of international law, including both treaties and customary interna-
tional law. Comments to the section note that the effect on a statute of a later incon-
sistent rule of customary international law is unclear. Id. § 115 cmt. d. The
Restatement also notes that courts have held that the President has the authority, at
least in some circumstances, to disregard a rule of international law. Id. § 115 report-
ers' note 3.
23. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609-10 (1889); Whitney v. Rob-
ertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-600 (1884).
But see Lobel, supra note 22, at 1108-10 (criticizing these cases).
24. In The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899), the Court stated, "[Wihere
there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations .... " Later, the
opinion restates this conclusion, finding that courts must apply a rule of international
law "in the absence of any treaty or other public act of their own government in
relation to the matter." Id. at 708.
Lower courts have relied on each of the domestic sources listed in The Paquete
Habana to override inconsistent customary international law. See, e.g., Galo-Garcia v.
INS, 86 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting refugee's customary international law
claim because Congress' "extensive legislative scheme for the admission of refugees"
governed it); Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1448 (5th Cir.
1993) (holding that international law is not controlling in the face of superseding fed-
eral executive, legislative, and judicial actions); Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.2d
956, 963 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding the court to be bound by a properly enacted statute,
even if it violates international law); Committee of United States Citizens Living in
Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[Siubsequently enacted
statutes.., preempt existing principles of customary international law - just as they
displaced prior inconsistent treaties."); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-55
(11th Cir. 1986) (finding prior executive act and controlling judicial decision sufficient
to override international law).
25. Bradley and Goldsmith acknowledge that many scholars recognize the federal
status of international law without also claiming for it the power to override decisions
of the executive branch or Congress. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 845-46.
Thus, the negative consequences they attribute such powers, id. at 857-58, are not
necessarily consequences of the core of the modern position defended in this article.
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were reflected in the text of the Constitution. Despite deep disagree-
ments about the allocation of powers between state and federal gov-
ernments, the framers showed surprising unity about the importance
of allocating control over foreign affairs to the federal government.
The unresolved differences about the constitutional division be-
tween state and federal authority worsened during the nineteenth cen-
tury, with the near collapse of the nation during the Civil War.
Entering this century, the increasing complexity and interdependence
of national political and economic relations imposed further stress on
the shifting line between federal and state areas of control. Contra-
dictory statements about the sources of emerging rules of law masked
the development of a federal common law independent of state law.
Part II analyzes this process as the courts struggled to define the
proper place of customary international law in the federal system-
some denied the possibility of nonstatutory federal law, while others
simultaneously developed and applied it.
The Erie decision-despite its ambiguities-resolved many of the
problems plaguing federal and state lawmaking powers and paved the
way for the proper understanding of international law as federal com-
mon law. Part III discusses the post-Erie development of federal
court common law powers, as well as the placement of international
law within the federal law framework. Finally, part IV explores the
implications of the modern position. Far from creating a breach
through which the federal judiciary, in collaboration with foreign pow-
ers, will impose foreign law on the unsuspecting states, customary in-
ternational law reflects the core of basic human values long treasured
in the United States, consented to by our political branches, and dem-
ocratic in origin.
I. FRAMING A CONSTITUTION RESPECTFUL OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS
The generation of jurists, statesmen, and political activists who
framed the Constitution firmly believed that fundamental moral prin-
ciples governed human society and placed limits upon the behavior of
both individuals and their governments. Among these rules were
those of international law, or the law of nations,26 binding on all sov-
ereign nations and their citizens. Concerned about the consequences
of violations of the law of nations, the framers drafted a Constitution
that empowered the national government to enforce that law, by as-
signing to the federal government control over issues touching upon
26. Known as the "law of nations" until the eighteenth century, -[nlowadays, the
terms the law of nations and international law are used interchangeably." Mark W.
Janis, An Introduction to International Law 1 (1988): see Restatement (Third), supra
note 7, pt. I, ch. 2, introductory note, at 41 ("the law of nations, later referred to as
international law").
1997] 399
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foreign affairs. This was accomplished in part by allocating to the fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over cases involving international law.
A. The Binding Obligation to Obey International Law
The Law of nations, although not specially adopted by the constitu-
tion or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the land.
Its obligation commences and runs with the existence of a nation
1 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 26, 27 (1792) (Edmund Randolph).
To understand the intended role of the federal judiciary in enforcing
international law, one must first understand how the framers of the
Constitution perceived the law of nations and the obligations it
imposed.27
Eighteenth century jurists and scholars viewed international law as
resting upon fundamental rules of natural law, binding on all individu-
als and all nations, with roots in both religious principles and human
reason.2 1 In those prepositivist years, it was generally accepted that
human conduct was governed by universal norms, and that fundamen-
tal principles underlying human society provided the moral and legal
foundation for all governments.29 Jurists and judges regularly referred
to immutable principles to justify their views of sovereign powers and
citizens' rights.3" Bernard Bailyn describes these rights as "God-
given, natural, inalienable rights, distilled from reason and justice
through the social and governmental compacts."'"
These basic common law rules were considered binding on all peo-
ple and all legal systems without the necessity of a legislative enact-
ment or executive decree. In fact, they thought it self-evident that no
legal code could catalogue "the great treasury of human rights. '32 To
the contrary, "Laws, grants, and charters merely stated the essentials
.... They marked out the minimum not the maximum boundaries of
right., 33 Although not connected to any particular sovereign, the ba-
27. For analysis of late eighteenth-century views of the law of nations, see Stewart
Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 819,
821-28 (1989); Lobel, supra note 22, at 1076-83.
28. Jay, supra note 27, at 823.
29. Lobel, supra note 22, at 1078-83.
30. Andrew Lenner, A Tale of Two Constitutions: Nationalism in the Federalist
Era, 40 Am. J. Legal Hist. 72, 79-86 (1996).
31. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 77 (The
Belknap Press, 5th printing 1971).
32. Id. at 78.
33. Id. "To claim more, to assert that all rights might be written into a comprehen-
sive bill or code was surely... 'the insolence of a haughty and imperious minister...
the flutter of a coxcomb, the pedantry of a quack, and the nonsense of a pettifogger."'
Id. (quoting James Otis, A Vindication of the British Colonies... 33 (John Harvard
Library 11, 1765)). Such fundamental principles are derived from "maxims and cus-
toms. . . of higher antiquity than memory or history can reach." 1 William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England *67.
[Vol. 66
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sic rules were the product of longstanding practice and custom, con-
sented to by many sovereigns over the course of time.' Judges did
not create or "make" such rules, but rather studied history, past prac-
tices, and the opinions of scholars and jurists, and applied their own
reason to determine applicable standards.35
This body of binding norms included the law of nations, the rules
governing transactions between sovereign states,36 consisting of "max-
ims and customs, consecrated by long use, and observed by nations in
their mutual intercourse with each other as a kind of law."37 Clearly
understood and accepted during the eighteenth century, the law of
nations was obligatory, binding on the United States as well as all
other nations. The key figures in the framing of the Constitution re-
peatedly stated this as a self-evident truth. In the words of the first
34. William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1513, 1517
(1984). Lobel argues that the most fundamental natural law norms were viewed as
imposing limits on governmental powers, even in the absence of consent. Lobel, supra
note 22, at 1078-95.
35. See Fletcher, supra note 34, at 1517-21; Jay, supra note 27, at 822-23; Lobel,
supra note 22, at 1082-83.
Today, it is easy to ridicule the notion that any body of law exists outside and in-
dependent of human lawmaking activity. From the profoundly positivist perspective
of the late twentieth century, the importance the framers ascribed to the fundamental
principles of the law of nations seems quaint, irrational, unscientific. Justice Holmes'
biting disparagement of the common law as "a brooding omnipresence in the sky"
seems to dispose of any pretense of legitimacy. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 221-22 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes did not categorically reject judi-
cial law-making, but angrily condemned such efforts when unconnected to an identifi-
able source:
I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can
do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular mo-
tions.... The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but
the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identi-
fied .... It is always the law of some State ....
Id. But, as Professor Fletcher has pointed out, both Holmes' statement and the mod-
em reaction to it are "time- and culture-bound." Fletcher, supra note 34, at 1517. In
the climate of the late eighteenth century, the time of the framing of our Constitution,
and well into the nineteenth century, learned jurists accepted that they and their gov-
ernment were bound to obey norms of conduct that derived from historical, moral
truths. See id. at 1517-18.
Professor Kramer recognizes that the common law making process was far more
"sophisticated" than implied by the image of a judge looking up to the stars (or into
his navel) to locate and decree predetermined rules. Rather, the common law was
based on principles "forged through practice and tradition." Kramer, supra note 2, at
281. "The task of a common law court was then to mold these principles to the exi-
gencies of the day, to preserve their essence by fitting them to evolving social customs
." Id. at 281-82.
36. Although the term "law of nations" was not always used consistently, it in-
cluded as a core element the law governing "controversies between nation and na-
tion." Jay, supra note 27, at 822 (quoting Justice James Iradell, Charge to the Grand
Jury for the District of South Carolina (May 12, 1794). in Gazette of the United States
(Philadelphia 1794)).
37. E. De Vattel, The Law of Nations lxw (Joseph Chitty ed., 1852).
1997]
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Chief Justice John Jay, echoing those of Attorney General Randolph
quoted above, "[T]he United States had, by taking a place among the
nations of the earth, become amenable to the law of nations."38
The framers of the Constitution were preoccupied with enforcing
the new nation's obligations, fearful that violations of international
law would drag the country into war with one of the more powerful
European nations.39 Violations of the law of nations, particularly
abuses committed against the citizens of other nations, were a chief
cause of war in the late eighteenth century. 0 This self-interest,
founded in the practical necessity of avoiding offenses that might pro-
voke an attack, meshed neatly with the moral conviction that a sover-
eign state should obey the law of nations.4'
During the period of the Confederation, the weak national govern-
ment faced several challenges due to its inability to enforce interna-
tional norms or to speak with one voice in foreign affairs. Congress
lacked the ability to punish violations of the law of nations42 and was
powerless to do more than urge the states to enforce international law
and punish violators. As early as 1781, the Continental Congress
passed a resolution recommending that the states provide punishment
for violations of the law of nations and permit those injured to file
38. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 474, 2 Dall. 333, 407 (1793). The leading
figures of the young nation reiterated the view that the law of nations was part of the
law of the United States. Jay, supra note 27, at 825-28 (quoting Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, and Charles Lee, among others). Leaders at the time of indepen-
dence "believed that the attainment of independence obligated the United States to
receive and to follow the law of nations [and] viewed adherence to international law
as a concomitant to sovereignty." Lobel, supra note 22, at 1084; see Anne-Marie Bur-
ley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 Am. J.
Int'l L. 461, 484 (1989).
Chief Justice Marshall restated the same point some thirty years later, when he
concluded, "[T]he Court is bound by the law of nations, which is part of the law of the
land." The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 423, 9 Cranch 242, 263 (1815).
39. "America was, after all, a weak power with an unproven government, operat-
ing in a world in which warfare was a common form of dispute resolution and a princi-
pal element of the international aspirations motivating many nations." Jay, supra note
27, at 821, 839-40.
40. Anthony D'Amato, Comment, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the
Constitution, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 62, 64 (1988) (noting that, in the eighteenth century,
the "plight of individual citizens in foreign countries, and not territorial ambitions,
was the major excuse for war").
41. Given the framers' belief that the law of nations was rooted in fundamental,
binding principles, their commitment to enforcing that law reflected in part a sense of
duty and honor. "The Framers sought to uphold the law of nations as a moral impera-
tive-a matter of national honor." Burley, supra note 38, at 482; id. at 475 (stating
that the framers understood the United States to have a "duty to propagate and en-
force" international law).
42. William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Com-
mitted in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 467, 490 (1986).
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civil suits.4 3 Several notorious incidents, in which foreign diplomats
were assaulted and the federal government had no power to act, con-
cerned the nation's political leaders during the 1780s." Jay com-
plained that the federal courts had no jurisdiction over such cases.4 5
Edmund Randolph echoed this complaint in 1787, noting that, "the
law of nations is unprovided with sanctions in many cases, which
deeply affect public dignity and public justice. '46 Enforcement of the
law of nations was important for business and economic growth, as
well as to maintain the peace. As Madison said, "We well know, sir,
that foreigners cannot get justice done them in these [state] courts,
and this has prevented many wealthy gentlemen from trading or resid-
ing among us." 47
As they approached the Constitutional Convention, then, the repre-
sentatives of the thirteen states brought with them both their funda-
mental belief that the law of nations bound the sovereign nation to
which they and their fellow citizens were giving birth, and a concern
that the Constitution they were drafting adequately ensure enforce-
ment of this sovereign obligation.
43. Id at 490; William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute:
A Response to the "Originalists," 19 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L Rev. 221, 226-27
(1996). Connecticut apparently was the only state to do so. Dodge, supra, at 228-29.
44. Casto, supra note 42, at 492-93 n.143 (listing repeated references to the
Marbois affair in correspondence among the framers). For example, when the French
Consul General was threatened in the home of the French Ambassador and later
assaulted, the federal government had no authority to intervene to punish the perpe-
trator or compensate the offended diplomat. Id. at 491-94; Dodge, supra note 43, at
229-30; Randall, supra note 7, at 24-28. The Continental Congress explained to
Marbois that, given the "nature of the federal union," the federal government had no
power to act on his behalf. Dodge, supra note 43, at 229-30 (quoting 27 Journals of the
Continental Congress 1774-1789, at 314 (Library of Congress 1912)). Shortly thereaf-
ter, Congress again urged the states to enact legislation punishing assaults on diplo-
mats and other violations of the law of nations. Casto, supra note 42, at 493 n.144;
Dodge, supra note 43, at 230 (citing 28 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-
1789, at 315 (Library of Congress 1912)). A similar incident in New York in 1787
demonstrated that the problem remained acute and unresolved. Casto. supra note 42,
at 494; Dodge, supra note 43, at 230 (describing an incident in which the New York
City police entered the Dutch Ambassador's home to arrest a servant).
45. Dodge, supra note 43, at 230 (citing 34 Journals of the Continental Congress
1774-1789, at 111 (Library of Congress 1912)).
46. A Letter of His Excellency Edmund Randolph, Esquire, on the Federal Con-
stitution (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted irl 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 86, 88 (Herbert
J. Storing ed., 1981). Randolph complained that the confederacy might be -doomed
to be plunged into war, from its wretched impotency to check offences against this
law." Id.
47. Dodge, supra note 43, at 235-36 (quoting 3 The Debates in the Several State
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 583 (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1881) (alteration in original)).
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B. Implementing the Commitment to the Law of Nations
My general plan would be to make the States one as to everything
connected with foreign nations, and several as to everything purely
domestic.
Thomas Jefferson 4
8
When they set about drafting a Constitution to reformulate the
terms of the union, the framers focused on the need to ensure federal
control over enforcement of the law of nations.49 Throughout the
1780s, Thomas Jefferson wrote repeatedly of the need to unify control
of foreign affairs in the federal government.5" A New York State
court judge echoed this language: "As a nation they [the thirteen
states] must be governed by one common law of nations; for on any
other principles how can they act with regard to foreign powers; and
how shall foreign powers act towards them?"51
Addressing the Constitutional Convention, Edmund Randolph
pointed to the central government's inability to sanction violations of
treaties and the law of nations as one of the chief failings of the Con-
federation.5" Randolph argued that the Confederation failed to pro-
vide security against foreign wars, because Congress "could not cause
infractions of treaties or of the law of nations, to be punished," as a
result of which, the states "might by their conduct provoke war with-
out controul [sic]."'53 Hamilton also saw the problem starkly: "It
seems scarcely to admit of controversy that the judiciary authority of
the Union ought to extend" to all cases that "relate to the intercourse
between the United States and foreign nations ... . He stated the
"plain proposition, that the peace of the whole ought not to be left at
48. Letter to Edward Carrington (Aug. 4, 1787), excerpted in Charles Warren, The
Making of the Constitution 382 (2d. ed. 1937).
49. It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws
of nations ... and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly
and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by
thirteen separate states or by three or four distinct confederacies.
The Federalist No. 3, at 11 (John Jay) (Colonial Press 1901).
50. Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 26, 36 n.28 (1952); Warren, supra note 48, at 14, 46,
47.
51. Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in 1 The Law Prac-
tice of Alexander Hamilton 392, 405 (Julius Goebel, Jr. ed., 1964). Judge Duane in-
sisted that the states must be considered as one entity in relation to the law of nations.
"What then must be the effect? What the confusion? [sic] if each separate state
should arrogate to itself a right of changing at pleasure those laws, which are received
as a rule of conduct, by the common consent of the greatest part of the civilized
world." Id. at 405-06.
52. Madison's Notes, reprinted in 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of
1787, at 19 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter Farrand]; see Dickinson,
supra note 50, at 36.
53. Dickinson, supra note 50, at 36.
54. The Federalist No. 80, at 438 (Alexander Hamilton) (Colonial Press 1901).
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the disposal of a part."55 Madison thus concluded, "This class of pow-
ers forms an obvious and essential branch of the federal administra-
tion. If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in
respect to other nations."-
56
With these concerns acutely in mind, the framers sought to design a
system of government in which the federal government would have
the power to guarantee the enforcement of the law of nations. 7 In
the words of Madison, "The federal Constitution forms a happy com-
bination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being re-
ferred to the national, the local and particular to the State,
legislatures."58 Dickinson later described the powers assigned to Con-
gress as "cover[ing] the whole area of external affairs as comprehen-
sively in its time as exceptional foresight and superior craftsmanship
could cover it."59 Indeed, such was the conclusion of a committed an-
tifederalist, who viewed the central government's extremely limited
powers as including "intercourse and concerns with foreign nations. '
The Constitution implemented this allocation of powers both through
positive grants of authority to the national government and by barring
the states from participating in foreign affairs.6" As the Supreme
55. Id. at 439. Hamilton continued, "The Union will undoubtedly be answerable
to foreign powers for the conduct of its members; and the responsibility for an injury
ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it." Id. The Supreme
Court has adopted a similar rationale in explaining the assignment of foreign affairs
powers to the federal government. See infra note 170, notes 23641 and accompanying
text, note 264.
56. The Federalist No. 41, at 228 (James Madison) (Colonial Press 1901). "This
one-nation idea has become a central tenet of constitutional law governing foreign
relations." Casto, supra note 42, at 515-16. Madison also noted "the advantage of
uniformity in all points which relate to foreign powers, and of immediate responsibil-
ity to the nation in all those for whose conduct the nation itself is to be responsible."
The Federalist No. 43 (James Madison), supra, at 245.
57. Given the importance of the law of nations to national affairs, the Fram-
ers assumed as a matter of course that the federal government should have
the ability to dominate most of the decisionmaking related to that law. Prin-
cipally this result was accomplished by giving the federal government control
over foreign relations, divided mainly between the executive and the Con-
gress, but with a prominent role for the federal courts.... [T]he persistent
idea was to provide a national monopoly of authority in order to assure re-
spect for international obligations.
Jay, supra note 27, at 829. Hamilton noted that federal legislators must be awrare of
the law of nations, because "as far as it is a proper object of municipal legislation, [it]
is submitted to the federal government." The Federalist No. 52, at 298 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Colonial Press 1901).
58. The Federalist No. 10, at 50 (James Madison) (Colonial Press 1901).
59. Dickinson, supra note 50, at 42; see David P. Currie, The Constitution in Con-
gress: The Third Congress, 1793-1795, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1996) (noting the
"widespread conviction that foreign relations was meant to be essentially a federal
matter").
60. 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, app. at 412 note E (S. George Tucker ed. &
comm., 1803).
61. The Constitution grants Congress the authority to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations," "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," "define and punish
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Court said some 150 years later, "Governmental power over external
affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national
government.
62
The framers of the Constitution were also clear as to their intent to
allocate jurisdiction over issues concerning foreign affairs to the fed-
eral courts. Thus, affairs touching on "intercourse with foreign na-
tions" were assigned to federal jurisdiction to produce "uniformity of
decision. "63 In the words of John Jay,
[U]nder the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as
well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense,
and executed in the same manner, whereas adjudications on the
same points and questions, in thirteen states .. .will not always
accord or be consistent .... The wisdom of the Convention, in com-
mitting such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts
appointed by and responsible only to one national government can-
not be too much commended. 64
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of
Nations," "declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules con-
cerning Captures on Land and Water," and "repel Invasions," U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,
while the President is to serve as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States," U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, appoint ambasadors subject to Senate ap-
proval, id., and "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers." Id. § 3.
The states, however, were prohibited from entering into "any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation;" or granting "Letters of Marque and Reprisal;" or, without the con-
sent of Congress, "lay[ing] any Duty of Tonnage, keep[ing] Troops, or Ships of War in
time of Peace, enter[ing] into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with
a foreign Power, or engag[ing] in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
Danger as will not admit of delay." U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
62. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937). This has been the consis-
tent holding of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) ("[T]he powers of external sovereignty [do] not de-
pend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution," but rather are "vested in the
federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality."); Id. at 325-26; Holmes
v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 575, 14 Pet. 470, 501-02 (1840) ("Every part of [the Constitu-
tion] shows that our whole foreign intercourse was intended to be committed to the
hands of the general government .... It was one of the main objects of the constitu-
tion to make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one people, and one nation
...."). Other commentators affirm this history. See Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 304
("Our Constitution assigns to the federal government a virtual monopoly over inter-
national relations."); Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinter-
pretation, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1297 (1996) ("The constitutional structure strongly
suggests that the states conferred all rights of external sovereignty on the federal gov-
ernment and retained none for themselves."); Note, The Federal Common Law, 82
Harv. L. Rev. 1512, 1521 (1969) ("[T]he absence of a specific mention of this power in
the Constitution indicates that.., the power to deal with foreign affairs is implied by
the very act of constituting a sovereign nation."); see also discussion infra notes 230-
42.
63. Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law, Part 11, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1231,
1268 (1985). Uniformity was seen as necessary in the interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, federal statutes, and "general law of the transnational variety." Id. at 1270.
64. The Federalist No. 3, at 11-12 (John Jay) (Colonial Press 1901); see Dickinson,
supra note 50, at 44; Dodge, supra note 43, at 235.
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Federal jurisdiction over cases touching upon the interests of foreign
governments would help avoid dragging the nation into unnecessary
conflict.
The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for
the conduct of its members; and the responsibility for an injury
ought ever to be accomplished with the faculty of preventing it. As
the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts ... is
with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that
the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which
the citizens of other countries are concerned. 65
The intent of the framers was to ensure national control over foreign
affairs, in part by assigning the federal courts jurisdiction over such
matters.66
The Constitution, of course, contains a direct reference only to trea-
ties, not customary international law.67 Earlier drafts included a refer-
ence to jurisdiction over cases that "arise... on the Law of Nations."
During the debates, this reference was removed without recorded ex-
planation,6 leaving jurisdiction over cases "arising . . . under Trea-
ties."' 69  Instead, the federal courts were assigned Article III
jurisdiction over a list of cases involving foreign affairs, including all
those involving ambassadors or other diplomats, concerning admiralty
and maritime law, and between U.S. states or citizens and foreign
states, citizens, or subjects.7" Although modern commentators disa-
gree about the significance of this change,71 contemporaries viewed
65. The Federalist No. 80, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Colonial Press 1901). As
interpreted by later Supreme Courts, the Constitution does not grant the federal
courts jurisdiction over all cases involving foreigners, as Hamilton apparently be-
lieved. The grant of diversity jurisdiction over "[c]ontroversies... between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects," U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2, has been interpreted to exclude cases between foreigners. See Hodgson v.
Bowerbank, 9 U.S. 303, 5 Cranch 169 (1809).
66. "The Convention was in substantial agreement that there must be a national
judiciary and that it must have, at least in the last resort, a paramount authority with
respect to the Law of Nations and treaties." Dickinson, supra note 50, at 38. As
George Mason described the sentiment at the Convention, "'The most prevalent idea
... is ... to establish ... a judiciary system with cognizance of all such matters as
depend upon the law of nations, and such other objects as the local courts of justice
may be inadequate to .... [sic]" Letter from George Mason to Arthur Lee (May 21,
1787), reprinted in 3 Farrand, supra note 52, at 24, see Jay, supra note 27, at 830.
67. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
68. Committee of Detail, Proceedings of the Convention (June 19-July 23, 1787),
in 2 Farrand, supra note 52, at 136, 157; Harold H. Sprout, Theories as to the Applica-
bility of International Law in the Federal Courts of the United States, 26 Am. J. Int'l L
280, 282-83 (1932); see Jay, supra note 27, at 830.
69. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
70. Id
71. This editing change has been read as indicating an intent to state that the law
of nations was not encompassed within the "laws of the United States." See Veisburd,
supra note 10, at 4 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 878, 886 (2d Cir. 1980)).
International law at the time, however, was not considered to be U.S. law, but rather
common law binding on all nations and all courts. The language may have been de-
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the list as covering the entire field of cases implicating relations with
other nations and their citizens. Hamilton, for example, explained
that all issues dealing with the law of nations were divided among the
separate Article III categories.72 Jay and Wilson shared the view that
the enumerated categories of jurisdiction satisfied the goal of as-
signing all cases involving the law of nations to the federal courts.73
Dickinson concludes that the supremacy clause, as approved, met "the
obvious and oft expressed need for an undivided national responsibil-
ity and power in all that pertained to relations with other nations, so
widely appreciated among the delegates. ' 74
Thus, there are significant indications that the framers intended the
listed provisions to have the effect of assigning jurisdiction over all
cases touching upon foreign affairs-including the law of nations-to
the federal courts.75 This conclusion is consonant with the even more
extensive evidence that one of the central purposes of the new Consti-
tution was to centralize the nation's foreign affairs powers in the three
branches of the federal government.
C. International Law as Common Law in Federal Courts
The framers, then, drafted and ratified a Constitution that assigned
control over foreign affairs to the three branches of the national gov-
leted to avoid granting federal jurisdiction over all of the commercial and other areas
included in the expansive definition of the law of nations in use at the time. Jay, supra
note 27, at 831. Given the repeated statements that all cases touching upon foreign
affairs were to fall within federal jurisdiction, the framers apparently thought that the
Article III categories included all such issues. Id. See Hamilton's description of the
Constitution as granting jurisdiction over "all causes in which the citizens of other
countries are concerned." supra note 65 and accompanying text.
72. The Federalist No. 80, at 439-41 (Alexander Hamilton) (Colonial Press 1901).
73. As Professor Jay has said:
[I]t bears stressing that the configuration of article III gave the federal courts
potential jurisdiction over every type of judicially cognizable case involving
the law of nations that the Framers thought needed treatment by the federal
judiciary. Both Hamilton and Jay in their respective Federalist papers ad-
vanced this viewpoint, and it is consistent with the Framers' underlying con-
cern for national dominance over key aspects of the law of nations.
Jay, supra note 27, at 831; see id. at 830 n.58; Sprout, supra note 68, at 281 ("[Tjhere is
unquestionably a good deal of evidence to indicate that the members of the Federal
Convention of 1787 intended to frame the Constitution so as to authorize the courts
to take cognizance of cases involving international legal questions.").
74. Dickinson, supra note 50, at 41. The framers sought to extend federal jurisdic-
tion to "[q]uestions as involve the national Peace and Harmony." Committee of De-
tail, Proceedings of the Convention (June 19-July 23, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note
52, at 133.
75. See Lobel, supra note 22, at 1093 & n.110 (concluding that specific Constitu-
tional provisions granting the federal government control over foreign affairs, viewed
in the context of the framers' concerns about enforcing international law, indicate that
"international law was to be federal law, enforced by the national judiciary"); Bruce
Stein, The Framers' Intent and the Early Years of the Republic, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 413,
511 (1982) (stating that "the distribution of power shows clearly that the Framers
intended the Congress to predominate in foreign policy").
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eminent. Their intent, in particular, was to assign the federal judiciary
jurisdiction over cases touching upon foreign affairs in order to guar-
antee uniform interpretation and enforcement on issues of concern to
the national polity. Given the complexity of the federal system, the
lack of models, and fundamental disagreements among the framers
about the relative strengths of the federal and state governments,
however, the structure they designed left many details unresolved.' 6
The Constitution set forth judicial powers and the divisions between
the state and federal courts in only "the broadest outline."'  The
structure the framers adopted was a product of their eighteenth cen-
tury concepts of jurisdiction, common law, and the interrelationship
between federal and state powers.
Uniformity in areas such as foreign affairs, seen as essential by the
framers, was to be obtained by assigning jurisdiction over such areas
to the federal courts.'8 The Constitution assigned jurisdiction over
specific areas, but left undefined the law the courts would apply to
decide cases falling within those categories. Distinctions between ar-
eas of state and federal authority were determined by evaluating the
subject matter at issue in a case or controversy, not by reference to the
body of law applicable to that subject matter.79 "Having fixed the
Court's jurisdiction, the delegates assumed that the Court, having ob-
tained jurisdiction, would exercise all functions and powers which
Courts were at that time in the judicial habit of exercising."' This
jurisdiction would include the power to determine the applicable law,
as courts had always and traditionally done."
The potential sources of law were broad, as broad "as the matters
cognizable in the federal courts."'
76. Kramer, supra note 2, at 292 ("[T]here was considerable uncertainty about
what exactly the relationship between state and federal governments would be. In
part, this uncertainty was intentional, and the framers deliberately left the appropriate
roles of state and national governments unsettled to facilitate ratification of the Con-
stitution and encourage further experimentation after its adoption."); Lenner, supra
note 30, at 89 (describing the Constitution's "ambiguously worded compromises")
(quoting Steven B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and
the Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 Nw. U. L Rev. 53, 65 (1978)).
77. Jay, supra note 63, at 1256.
78. A wealth of evidence is available to demonstrate an original understand-
ing that certain recognized bodies of law should be developed uniformly,
and that interference by the states would have negative ramifications at
home and abroad. But historically these areas were not -federalized" in the
way implicated by the current invocation of federal common law. Uniform-
ity was instead to be achieved by providing access to federal courts, some-
times exclusive of state courts.
Id. at 1321.
79. Id. at 1265-66.
80. Warren, supra note 48, at 332; see Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 Harv.
L. Rev. 1512, 1515-16 (1969).
81. Jay, supra note 63, at 1262.
82. 1 Blackstone's Commentaries supra note 60, at app. 430; see also Fletcher,
supra note 34, at 1524.
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[Tihe law of nations, the common law of England, the civil law, the
law maritime, the law merchant, or the lex loci, or law of the foreign
nation, or state, in which the cause of action may arise, or shall be
decided, must in their turn be resorted to as the rule of decision,
according to the nature and circumstances of each case,
respectively.
83
As much of this law was uncodified, the courts were bound to develop
and apply the common law governing each of these areas.84 But the
resulting law was not "federal common law," a concept which had no
meaning in the late eighteenth century. Common law was neither fed-
eral nor state, as it did not pertain to any sovereign, but was common
to all.85
83. 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, supra note 60, at 430. While the Constitution
did not specify how the federal courts were to determine which of these bodies of law
applied to a given case, Congress offered broad guidelines in the Rules of Decision
Act, a provision of the First Judiciary Act. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat.
73, 92 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994)). Congress instructed the federal
courts to follow "the laws of the several states ... in cases where they apply." Id. As
William Fletcher has demonstrated, this provision "was generally understood to be
merely declaratory of existing law." Fletcher, supra note 34, at 1527. It codified ac-
cepted practice: Federal courts would implement state law where it applied, i.e., for
"local" issues, and apply "general law" to determine all other issues. Id. at 1532; Jay,
supra note 63, at 1263-65 (describing the Act as noncontroversial at the time of its
passage).
As discussed above, supra notes 28-38 & accompanying text, the fundamental prin-
ciples encompassed by the general common law were neither federal nor state, but
rather existed outside of both legal systems. Common law was simply the law to be
applied by all courts. Eighteenth century jurists saw no need to tie this law to a par-
ticular sovereign. To the contrary, such a tie would have contradicted the very nature
of the common law.
84. See Alton B. Parker, The Common Law Jurisdiction of the United States
Courts, 17 Yale L.J. 1, 6 (1907) (describing the framers' intent "that the National
system of jurisprudence should be upbuilded according to such rules of the Common
Law as should be found applicable"); see also Kramer, supra note 2, at 274 (1992)
("[Tihe limited jurisdiction of the federal courts affects only the proper subject-matter
of any federal common law, not the power to make such law in the first place.").
85. Although courts were authorized to "interpret[ ] the law of nations directly,"
they were not thereby interpreting federal law, but rather "ascertaining the law com-
mon to all courts." Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 7, at 58 & n.22.
The law of nations was not "law" as we usually think of it today-that is, a
sovereign command. But neither was it a "brooding omnipresence in the
sky." [citing Holmes.] Rather, as Swift suggests, the law of nations was an
identifiable body of rules and customs developed and refined by a variety of
nations over hundreds and, in some cases, thousands of years .... In es-
sence, the law of nations operated as a set of background rules that courts
applied in the absence of any binding sovereign command to the contrary.
Because of the character of such law, federal and state courts had no occa-
sion to characterize the various branches of the law of nations as either fed-
eral or state law. At the time it was thought to be neither.
Clark, supra note 62, at 1279-80 (footnotes omitted); see Brilmayer, supra note 5, at
302.
In Marshall's formulation, the Constitution created distinct classes of cases over
which the federal courts were granted jurisdiction and to which they would apply
international law where applicable; but such cases did not arise under the Constitu-
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The law of nations, however, played a somewhat different role in
the federal system than other areas of common law. First, federal con-
trol over foreign affairs, including federal supremacy over the law of
nations, was part of the original constitutional scheme and presup-
posed no conflict with state control over domestic affairs. Implemen-
tation of the law of nations by federal courts thus did not trigger
concerns about the intrusive consequences of federal common law
powers. Federal supremacy over the law of nations did not presup-
pose a conflict with state control over domestic affairs.' Moreover,
the law of nations was, by definition, quite different from other cate-
gories of common law. General common law rules could be
adopted-or not adopted-by a particular jurisdiction, and could be
changed by statute without repercussions on the nation as a whole or
its relations with other States.' The law of nations, however, re-
flected the practice and consensus of the various nations of the world.
Neither the United States nor any individual government could alter
or amend its rules. Any nation could also disobey it, but failure to
fion or the law of the United States. G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Inter-
national Law: The Piracy Cases, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 727, 727-28 (1989). Marshall stated
this view most clearly in American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 1 Pet. 388
(1828):
A case in admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or the laws
of the United States. These cases are as old as navigation itself; and the law,
admiralty and maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied by our Courts to
the cases as they arise.
Id. at 545-46, 1 Pet. at 414.
86. The only areas in which anything resembling modern federal common law
was to be applied were admiralty law and the law of nations. Both of these
possessed an element of transnationality that made untenable any charge of
interference with the territorial sovereignty rights of a state. More basically,
federal competence in these areas was part of the original constitutional
bargain.
Jay, supra note 63, at 1321-22.
87. The common law "was adopted [by the states] so far only as its principles were
suited to the condition of the colonies: and from this circumstance we see, what is
common law in one state, is not so considered in another." Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.
591, 659, 8 Pet. 498, 555 (1834). In Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), for
example, the Court applied a common law contract rule that New York State courts
had declined to follow. Id- at 16-18, 16 Pet. at 11-13.
88. Vattel described the core of the law of nations as "immutable," imposing bind-
ing obligations so that "nations can neither make any changes in it by their conven-
tions, dispense with it in their own conduct, nor reciprocally release each other from
the observance of it." E. De Vattel, The Law of Nations lviii (Joseph Chitty ed., 1852);
see Lobel, supra note 22, at 1084-90. Professor Lobel collects persuasive evidence
that jurists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries thought that the legislature
lacked the authority to enact legislation in violation of the law of nations. Id.
The law of nations could, however, evolve over time and sovereign states could
attempt to influence its development. The early U.S. administrations quite con-
sciously tried to do so. Jay, supra note 27, at 845-46. Such efforts, of course, would
have been undertaken by the federal government, not the states, as the federal gov-
ernment was the only actor representing the nation on the international stage.
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obey rendered the disobedient nation subject to sanctions-including
war-from other nations.89
The brief debate in the Constitutional Convention about the exact
wording of the clause granting Congress the power to "define and
punish ... offenses against the law of nations"9 illustrates the fram-
ers' understanding of the law of nations as existing independently of
the United States and its legislature. 91 The issue was whether to in-
clude the power of definition, despite arguments that the implication
that the United States could modify the law of nations was absurd. In
Wilson's words, "To pretend to define the law of nations which de-
pended on the authority of all the Civilized Nations of the World,
would have a look of arrogance that would make us ridiculous."9 "
The terminology was included with the understanding that "define" in
context meant only to concretize and transform into legislation, not to
alter the underlying content of this transnational body of law.93
The framers' concern about enforcement of the law of nations thus
led them to draft a Constitution that guaranteed federal control over
the nation's international law obligations. Federal authority was not
limited to the political branches, but also encompassed the federal ju-
diciary, which would play a key role in interpreting and implementing
the law of nations. International law could not be left to the diverse
decisions of the states and their judiciaries, for the states were neither
responsible for its implementation nor accountable on an interna-
tional level for its violation.
As the relationship between state and federal lawmaking powers
became increasingly strained during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the place of customary international law became
unclear, a confusion resolved only by the combined holdings of Erie9
89. During the Washington presidency, when Great Britain requested permission
to move troops across U.S. territory as part of a conflict with Spain, Washington
sought written opinions on the responses open to the United States under the law of
nations. Jay, supra note 27, at 840. The responses, Jay observes, "were designed to
show whether particular options would give another power a basis to declare war." Id.
90. U.S. Const. art. III, § 8.
91. Madison's Notes, in 2 Farrand, supra note 52, at 615.
92. Id.; Charles D. Siegal, Deference and its Dangers: Congress' Power to "Define
... Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 21 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 865, 876 (1988).
93. Lobel, supra note 22, at 1093-94 (noting that participants in the debate about
the "define and punish" clause expressed concern about the implication that the na-
tional legislature had authority to "define" the law of nations).
The power to "punish" offenses seems to have been included in order to
make clear that the subject was one of federal rather than state concern; the
power to "define" them was added because of a conviction that the law of
nations was "often too vague and deficient to be a rule.
See Currie, supra note 59, at 13 (quoting Mr. Govr. Morris, in 2 Farrand, supra note
52, at 615) (additional citations omitted).
94. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1937).
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and Sabbatino.95 The federal courts, however, never completely lost
sight of their historic role as the interpreter of international law.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS FEDERAL LAW PRE-ERiE
The elegant constitutional structure-a product of compromise that
avoided resolving some of the fundamental disagreements among its
framers-provoked immediate controversy over the relative powers
of the state and federal governments. Impassioned battles over the
role of the central government eventually led to decades of secession,
war, and Reconstruction, during which basic concepts of federal-state
authority were in dispute. The federal courts sought-often unsuc-
cessfully-to forge a consensus as to their role in governing the frac-
tious body politic. As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the
dominant general common law paradigm became increasingly inade-
quate to meet the needs of a national economy and a nation playing
an increasingly powerful role in international affairs. Erie put it to
rest to general approbation in 1938. The judicial decisions crafted
during this pre-Erie period include the beginnings of the "true" fed-
eral common law that eventually emerged. Norms of international
law joined a small category governed by a common law that increas-
ingly resembled federal common law, although the legal theories of
the day prevented courts from clearly labeling it as such.
A. General Common Law and the Tensions Between National and
State Interests
Battles over the extent of federal powers began almost immediately
after the ratification of the Constitution. The proposal to establish a
national bank prompted howls of protest from Republicans, who ar-
gued that it exceeded the federal government's constitutional pow-
ers.96 The Alien and Sedition Acts sparked similar outrage. '
Congress sought to justify the Sedition Act in part by arguing that the
federal government had an implied power to penalize acts that might
95. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
96. Jay, supra note 63, at 1244-46; Lenner, supra note 30, at 89 (noting that the
battle over the federal government's right to establish a national bank -reveal[ed] a
profound clash over the nature of federal-state relations").
97. John J. Janssen, Dualist Constitutional Theory and the Republican Revohtion
of 1800, 12 Const. Commentary 381, 386-92 (1995), Jay, supra, note 63, at 1246. The
Alien Act authorized the President to expel aliens he deemed dangerous. Alien Act,
ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798); see Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 Yale I.
909, 927-38 (1991) (analyzing debates over aliens' rights under the Constitution). The
Sedition Act criminalized criticism of the government. The Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1
Stat. 596 (1798). Debates over both acts focused in part on competing views of state
and federal powers. Opponents argued that the Constitution entailed a compact
among the states that afforded them the right to challenge violations of that agree-
ment by the federal government; supporters claimed that the federal government had
inherent rights to defend itself from attack. Jay, supra note 63, at 1246-49; Neuman,
supra, at 928.
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lead to sedition-an expansive interpretation of the "necessary and
proper" clause that would justify federal punishment of virtually any
conduct.98
The debate surrounding federal court jurisdiction over common law
crimes raged for decades. Several early prosecutions for violations of
neutrality assumed that the federal government could prosecute indi-
viduals for violations of the law of nations.9 9 "Every leading official in
the Washington Administration, including Jefferson, asserted that it
was unlawful for American citizens to act contrary to their country's
obligations under the law of nations." 100 The issue, however, became
entwined in the battle over the powers of the federal government.
The common law of the time was far-reaching, governing matters of
daily life. Furthermore, it was assumed that the powers of the sepa-
rate branches of the federal government were co-extensive. Thus, ac-
knowledging federal court jurisdiction over all of the common law
would have constituted a broad expansion of federal government
powers. Although the federal judiciary supported the concept of com-
mon-law crimes,10' opponents of expansive federal powers accused
the federalists of seeking to dominate the states through federal juris-
diction over the common law.l02
By the time the issue of jurisdiction over common law crimes
reached the Supreme Court in 1812, the Jeffersonian majority on the
Court used the case as a vehicle for blocking further expansion of fed-
eral authority at the expense of the states."0 3 Jurisdiction over com-
mon law crimes would imply powers that were "indefinite, applicable
to a great variety of subjects,"'1 4 and form the basis for the broad-
ranging powers similar to the common law powers of the British
98. Jay, supra note 63, at 1246-50.
99. See, e.g., Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 133, 161 (1795) (holding that the
federal government can prosecute individuals who violate the law of nations);
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 474, 2 Dall. 363, 408 (1793) (same); Henfield's Case,
11 F. Cas. 1099, 1104-05 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Grand Jury Charge of Wilson,
Cir. J.); Jay, supra note 27, at 825-26 (citing Charge to the Grand Jury for the District
of South Carolina (May 12, 1794) (Justice James Iradell), in Gazette of the United
States (Philadelphia) (May 12, 1794); Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of
Virginia (May 22, 1793), in 3 The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 480
(H. Johnston ed., 1891); Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of New York (Apr.
4, 1790), in New Hampshire Gazette (Portsmouth 1790)).
100. Jay, supra note 27, at 842.
101. Id. at 843.
102. Id.; Fletcher, supra note 34, at 1522-24. As explained by St. George Tucker:
[1]f it be true that the common law of England, has been adopted by the
United States in their national, or federal capacity, the jurisdiction of the
federal courts must be co-extensive with it; or, in other words, unlimited: so
also, must be the jurisdiction, and authority of the other branches of the fed-
eral government; that is to say, their powers respectively must be, likewise,
unlimited.
1 Blackstone, Commentaries, supra note 60, at app. note E.
103. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
104. Id. at 33.
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courts. The decision rejecting such authority received only lukewarm
support from the Court, which unsuccessfully invited efforts to seek a
reversal in a later case.105 But the principle that federal courts have
no power to define common law crimes remained. Soon thereafter, in
Wheaton v. Peters,0 6 the Supreme Court declared broadly that "there
can be no common law of the United States."' 07 This dicta, however,
had little impact on the ongoing debate."08 Federal courts continued
to exact substantial common law powers,' 0 9 while critics continued to
predict that federal common law would be the means by which the
federal government usurped the powers of the states." 0
105. In United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. 415, 1 Wheat. 191 (1816), the Court indi-
cated that it was willing to reconsider Hudson, given that "a difference of opinion has
existed, and still exists among the members of the court." Id. at 416, 1 Wheat at 192.
Neither the attorney general nor the defendant chose to argue Coolidge, however, so
the Court followed its prior decision in Hudson. Id. Recent articles indicate that the
Hudson decision may have been more a result of the controversy surrounding the
issue of seditious libel than a rejection of federal common law. Kramer, supra note 2,
at 278-79; Gary D. Rowe, Note, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin, the Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law
Crimes, 101 Yale LJ. 919 (1992).
Currie notes the distinction between the issues raised by Hudson and debates about
the constitutional status of the law of nations: "Hudson was a garden-variety libel
case, explainable in part by the legitimate fear that federal prosecution would under-
mine states' rights; no one argued that foreign relations should be left to the states."
Currie, supra note 59, at 13.
106. 33 U.S. 591, 8 Pet. 498 (1834).
107. Id. at 658, 8 Pet. at 554.
108. Wheaton's statement about the common law was not necessary to the decision
in the case, which was governed by a federal statute. Describing this "unfortunate"
Wheaton language as dicta, one early twentieth century commentator viewed it as a
product of nineteenth century controversies about states rights. Parker, supra note 84,
at 11. Parker concluded that neither the Supreme Court nor lower federal courts
relied on Wheaton, and that the decision had not limited in any way the lawmaking
powers of the federal courts, which had continued, as before, to "avail[ ] themselves
of our great storehouse of Common Law principles." Id.
109. Id. at 1323; Kramer, supra note 2, at 278-79. That Wheaton had no more effect
on federal common lawmaking than Hudson and Coolidge reflects the fact that all
three cases resolved issues with very specific antecedents. The first two resolved the
contentious issues raised by the Sedition Acts, while Wheaton addressed the copyright
status of public documents-Supreme Court opinions. In Wheaton, the Court re-
solved a bitter dispute between a former court reporter, Henry Wheaton, and his
successor, Richard Peters. Peters had published an abridged version of Wheaton's
reports that was shorter, less expensive, and therefore much more accessible to mem-
bers of the bar. Wheaton claimed a copyright infringement. The Court fought bit-
terly-and publicly-about the decision, as thoroughly detailed in Craig Joyce, The
Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court
Ascendancy, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1291, 1379-85 (1985). The case's holding that "copy-
right is a statutory grant," not a common law privilege, "remains foundational" to
modern U.S. copyright law. Id. at 1291. Wheaton also contributed to the Marshall
Court's assertion of federal supremacy, holding that the Constitutional grant of fed-
eral authority over copyright law superseded any state common law copyright protec-
tions. Id. at 1292.
110. Jay, supra note 63, at 1300 ("As long as the potential for expansion of jurisdic-
tion remained, the nightmare of a vast expansion of the federal establishment could
be brought back to mind.").
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The battle over the federal common law had little impact on the
contemporaneous incorporation of international law rules by the fed-
eral courts. The Supreme Court repeatedly held that international
law was a part of U.S. law and continued to apply it in a broad range
of cases. For example, in the early case of Chisholm v. Georgia,III
Chief Justice John Jay explained that the law of nations was binding
upon the national government and within the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts:
[I]n their national character and capacity, the United States were
responsible to foreign nations for the conduct of each State, relative
to the laws of nations, and the performance of treaties; and there
the inexpediency of referring all such questions to State Courts, and
particularly to the Courts of delinquent states became apparent....
These were among the evils which it was proper for the nation, that
is, the people of all the United States, to provide by a national judi-
ciary, to be instituted by the whole nation, and to be responsible to
the whole nation. 11
2
Similar conclusions about federal jurisdiction over issues of interna-
tional law were expressed in the official opinions of various U.S. attor-
ney generals.'1 3 Later cases continued to apply such international
rules as a matter of course, in the absence of statutory authoriza-
tion.1 4 Many involved the law of prize, an area the Constitution as-
111. 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dall. 363 (1793).
112. Id. at 474, 2 Dall. at 407.
113. See, e.g., 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 299 (1865) ("That the laws of nations consti-
tute a part of the laws of the land is established from the face of the Constitution,
upon principle and by authority."); 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 495, 503 (1855) ("The laws of the
United States [include] the Constitution, treaties, acts of Congress, equity and admi-
ralty law, and the law of nations, public and private, as administered by the Supreme
Court, and Circuit and District Courts of the United States, and, in certain cases,
regulations of the Executive Departments," all of which are distinct from "the com-
mon law" administered by the "courts of the several States."); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 566,
570 (1822) (stating that the laws of the United States include "not merely the constitu-
tion, statutes, and treaties of the United States, but those general laws of nations
which govern the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations"); 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797) ("The common law has adopted the law of nations in its
fullest extent, and made it a part of the law of the land."); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27
(1782) ("The law of nations, although not specially adopted by the constitution or any
municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the land."). But see 5 Op. Att'y Gen.
691, 692 (1802) ("The law of nations is considered as a part of the municipal law of
each State."), an opinion "completely in contradiction to earlier opinions by Federal-
ist Attorneys General." Jay, supra note 27, at 844 n.115.
114. See, e.g., Jecker v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 110, 112 (1855) (holding
that the law of nations is part of the domestic law of every nation). See also commen-
tary published after the decisions in Hudson and Coolidge, analyzing the earlier grandjury charge and decision in Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (1793), and distinguishing
federal common law authority over violations of the law of nations from such author-
ity over other areas of law.
The law of nations, being the common law of the civilized world, may be
said, indeed to be a part of the law of every civilized nation; but it stands on
other and higher grounds than municipal customs, statutes, edicts, or ordi-
nances. It is binding on every people and on every government. It is to be
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signed federal jurisdiction'15 and in which the federal courts regularly
developed common law rules. In Talbot v. Janson,t"" for example, Jus-
tice Iradell declared that the law of nations is a part of "our own law"
and applied that law to determine jurisdiction over a ship captured as
prize."17 Some years later, Chief Justice Marshall applied the law of
nations to determine the validity of a confiscation as a prize of war,
stating that, in the absence of alternative instructions from Congress,
"the Court is bound by the law of nations, which is part of the law of
the land.""'  The relevance of the law of nations was recognized as
well in a nonprize case, Ware v. Hylton,"1 9 which applied the laws of
war to determine the validity of Virginia's attempt to confiscate
debts.'20
During the same time period, the Supreme Court regularly applied
the presumption that congressional enactments should be interpreted,
when possible, consistently with international law. As initially stated
in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy,1 2 1 this oft-repeated presump-
tion holds that "an act of congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction re-
mains."' This presumption indicates that the Court viewed interna-
tional law as a backdrop to all legislation, ever-present in legislative
carried into effect at all times under the penalty of being thrown out of the
pale of civilization or involving the country into a war.... Whether there is
or not a national common law in other respects this universal common law
can never cease to be the rule of executive and judicial proceedings until
mankind shall return to the savage state.
Id at 1122 n.6. The commentator concludes that, if Hudson and Coolidge cannot be
distinguished from the earlier Henfield's Case, the law announced in Henfield should
be considered controlling, given the authority of the many jurists who assented to it
and the lack of argument in either Hudson or Coolidge. Id.
115. "The judicial Power shall extend ... to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction ... ." Const. art. III, § 2.
116. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795).
117. Id. at 161.
118. The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 423, 9 Cranch 242, 263 (1815); see also Thirty Hogs-
heads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. 191, 198, 9 Cranch 118, 122 (1815) ("The law of
nations is the great source from which we derive those rules, respecting belligerent
and neutral rights, which are recognized by all civilized and commercial states
throughout Europe and America."); The Rapid, 12 U.S. 155, 162, 8 Cranch 92, 96
(1814) (applying the law of nations to determine whether a citizen's property was
subject to confiscation, noting that "[t]he law of prize is part of the law of nations");
Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 36-38, 1 Cranch 1, 22-24 (1801) (applying the law of na-
tions to determine whether the recapture of a vessel seized as prize by the French
entitled the recapturer to a "salvage" award).
119. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
120. Id. at 281 ("When the United States declared their independence, they were
bound to receive the law of nations, in its modem state of purity and refinement.").
121. 6 U.S. 64, 2 Cranch 34 (1804).
122. Id. at 117-18, 2 Cranch at 67; see Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of Interna-
tional Law As a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 Vand. L Rev. 1103,
1135-1143 (1990) (reviewing the application of the Charming Betsy principle in subse-
quent cases).
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deliberations and enforceable by the courts through statutory
construction.
By the mid-nineteenth century, the federal courts had developed
the model of federal/state powers over the common law which domi-
nated until Erie, some ninety years later. Swift v. Tyson'23 held that,
in matters of general law not governed by state statutes and not con-
cerning local issues such as ownership of property, federal courts were
not bound by state court decisions.124 While greatly reviled in the
twentieth century, Professor Fletcher has shown that it was noncon-
troversial at the time it was decided, reflecting a regime which was
already in place and functioned reasonably well to resolve many issues
touching on the economic life of the nation.' 5 In areas affecting na-
tional concerns, however, the general common law regime worked
well only to the extent that state and federal courts arrived at similar
decisions in a reasonably foreseeable manner. The system began to
break down when increasing disparities between state and federal de-
cisions collided with the national economy's growing need for uni-
formity.' 26  Furthermore, general common law never provided a
satisfactory rule of law for topics clearly within federal control. In
response to the obvious need, the notion of a true federal common
law began to emerge in several areas, including suits between states,
interstate commerce, and international law. Each of these addressed
national themes, with problems that were not resolved by legislation.
Although not fully realized until Erie, "this kind of judge-made law
had its pre-Erie antecedents, and the conceptual basis for it was clear
long before Erie.'112 7
123. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
124. See id. at 16-18.
125. Fletcher, supra note 34, at 1513-14. Fletcher points out that Story's son, in a
biography describing Justice Story's leading opinions, did not even mention Swift v.
Tyson. Id. at 1514. The increasingly national and international economy required uni-
formity in applicable rules. "The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly
declared.., to be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the
commercial world." Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. at 19. Several factors rendered important
a federal role in the development of the law governing such issues. Many of the states
published judicial opinions only irregularly at best, and the quality of their judiciaries
varied widely. See Paul M. Bator et al., eds., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts
and the Federal System 775 (3d ed. 1988); Fletcher, supra note 34, at 1555 n.204, 1555-
57. Moreover, the states represented varying economic interests, and their decisions
were often colored by the self interest of their local citizens. Fletcher, supra note 34,
at 1566.
In some areas, the Swift regime produced a uniform body of law that greatly simpli-
fied multistate legal interactions. Fletcher documented the well-respected body of
law governing marine insurance, which was developed by the federal courts in the
nineteenth century. Id. at 1554. In other areas, self-interest and regional variations
prevailed. In debtor-creditor law, for example, the tensions among states and the
refusal to follow the federal decisions led to increasing chaos. Id. at 1556.
126. See discussion supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
127. Hill, supra note 5, at 1036 n.67. Judges and commentators throughout the
nineteenth and early twentieth century recognized that the federal law they were
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The Supreme Court, for example, had long recognized disputes be-
tween states over boundaries or water rights as falling within an area
of federal control to which federal law applied. Such cases cast the
choice of law issue in clear relief, for it obviously would be inappropri-
ate to apply the law of either state. Instead, the Court drew an anal-
ogy to sovereign states and applied the law of nations to decide issues
such as the location of borders defined by rivers.12- The Court rea-
soned that, because the states each stand on "the same level" with an
"equality of right," a state "can impose its own legislation on no one
of the others, and is bound to yield its own views to none."1 29 The
Supreme Court was thus bound to develop a body of law to govern its
decisions, "in such a way as will recognize the equal rights of both. ' "°
In so doing, the Court "[was] practically building up what may not
improperly be called interstate common law.' 131 For example, in a
dispute between Kansas and Missouri over the exact location of a bor-
der defined by a river, the Court searched for a decision based on
principles of international law, national law, and state law-all part of
the judicially crafted body of law.132
Some two decades later, the Court invoked common law powers to
apply a federal rule of law, even though the states party to the dispute
making had ramifications beyond that of the interpretation of a purely state-based
general common law. Robert von Moschzisker, for example, in a 1926 article quoted
from this 1843 New York state case:
[T]here is no room for doubt, but that to a limited extent the common law
... prevails in the United States as a system of national jurisprudence. It
seems to be a necessary consequence - that in a matter which by the Union
has become a national subject, to be controlled by a principle co-extensive
with the United States, in the absence of constitutional or congressional pro-
vision on the subject, it must be regulated by the principles of the Common
Law, if they are pertinent and applicable.
Robert von Moschzisker, The Common Law and Our Federal Jurispnrdence, 74 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 367, 371 n.129 (1926) (quoting Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583, 654-55 (N.Y.
1843)).
128. In Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. 380, 13 How. 409 (1851), the Court decided a
dispute about the exact boundary between Georgia and Alabama by applying a rule
of the law of nations governing river borders: When a state is formed through a grant
of territory by a pre-existing state, with a river as the border, the entire river falls
within the territory of the pre-existing state. Id. at 411-12, 13 How. at 441-43. The
Court noted that the issue was governed by a "principle of national law." Id. at 413, 13
How. at 443. The Howard Court, id. at 412, 13 How. at 442-43, noted that the rule
had been first set out by Marshall in Handly's Lessee r. Anthony, 18 U.S. 374, 379-80,
5 Wheat. 172, 174-75 (1820), where Marshall referred to it as a rule -established by
the common consent of mankind." Handly's Lessee, 18 U.S. at 380, 5 Wheat. at 174.
129. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
130. Id. at 98.
131. Id.
132. "Sitting, as it were, as an international, as well as a domestic tribunal, we apply
Federal law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the particular case
may demand." Id. at 97 (quoting opinion on demurrer in the same case, 185 U.S. 125,
146-47 (1902)); see also Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 266 (1891) (apply-
ing international law principles to determine the limits of state control over territorial
waters and fisheries).
1997]
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agreed upon a common rule, different than that adopted by the
Supreme Court. In Connecticut v. Massachusetts,133 Connecticut
sought to enjoin Massachusetts from diverting water from the water-
shed of the Connecticut River to meet the needs of Boston and other
cities.1 34 Both states recognized the common-law doctrine that each
riparian owner had a right to the unimpaired, undiminished flow of
the river.'35 The Court, however, declined to apply the law common
to the two states, holding instead that the controversy must be gov-
erned by the developing "interstate common law" identified in Kansas
v. Colorado.'36 The Supreme Court crafted this uniquely federal law
to accommodate the national needs of the growing population, not
just to recognize the quasi-sovereign equality of the states.137
In this period in which the federal courts were bound by Swift v.
Tyson, the common law rules governing disputes between states were
of a completely different nature than Swift's general common law.138
Federal needs and interests governed, even in the face of agreement
between the contending states about alternative rules of law. In these
cases, the Court had begun the development of a "true" federal com-
mon law.
Similarly, federal common law applied in cases decided by the
Court of Claims, "the one court in the Union... that deals at all times
with matters of national concern arising under the Constitution and
laws of the United States.' 39 In Moore v. United States, the Supreme
Court held that, in the absence of congressional instructions to the
contrary, cases brought before the Court of Claims should be gov-
133. 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
134. Id. at 662.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 670-71. The federal government's search for a fair resolution of the con-
troversy necessitated application of a fair rule, not just the rule in effect in either state.
See Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1512, 1520 (1969) (stressing
the federal government's need to ensure the "just settlement of disputes between its
component parts").
137. See, e.g., Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 523 (1936) ("To limit the long
established use in Oregon would materially injure Oregon users without a compensat-
ing benefit to Washington users." (quoting the Special Master's Report)); Connecticut
v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 673 (1931) ("Drinking and other domestic purposes
are the highest uses of water. An ample supply of wholesome water is essential.");
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907) (emphasizing the transformation of bar-
ren, unoccupied land into fertile fields, while working comparatively little harm to
Kansas). The Washington v. Oregon Court also imposed a rule requiring a com-
plaining state to show an injury "of serious magnitude" by "clear and convincing evi-
dence" before it would interfere in a dispute between states. Washington v. Oregon,
297 U.S. at 522 (quoting New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921)).
138. The post-Erie implications of this line of cases will be examined infra at notes
220-27 and accompanying text, as set forth in the famous water rights case decided the
same day as Erie, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92
(1938) (holding that federal common law controls water rights disputes between states
and affords federal question jurisdiction).
139. Parker, supra note 84, at 14.
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erned by the common law, "the system from which our judicial ideas
and legal definitions are derived."14
The increasingly interconnected national economy led the courts to
articulate the need for a national common law in other areas, while
nevertheless unable to break free from Swift to articulate it fully. Ef-
forts to develop a federal law governing interstate businesses such as
transportation and communication illustrate the strains undermining
the Swift v. Tyson regime. In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v.
Baugh,4' for example, the Court applied its own interpretation of the
general common law to determine an employer's liability to an em-
ployee injured by the negligence of another. The state had a clear
common law rule governing the issue, which the Court declined to
follow:
[I]t is a question in which the nation as a whole is interested....
Commerce between the States is a matter of national regulation,
and to establish it as such was one of the principal causes which led
to the adoption of our Constitution .... The lines of this very plain-
tiff in error extend into half a dozen or more States .... As it
passes from State to State, must the rights, obligations, and duties
subsisting between it and its employes[sic] change at every state
line?1
42
The Court's reasoning made clear the need for uniform, national rules
governing the liability of industries that span many states. The
Court's resolution, however, is totally nonresponsive to the problem it
articulates: Suits in state courts will be decided by the varying rules in
each state; litigants' rights will vary depending on what state they are
in and whether or not they trigger diversity jurisdiction; and state
rules will govern, in any event, where the rule has been codified by
statute. The contrast between the problem and the unsatisfactory so-
lutions available to both the majority and the dissent foretell the ten-
sions that gave rise to the Erie decision forty-five years later.
During those years, the Supreme Court continued to struggle with
the clash between national needs and the limitations of federal law-
making power in contradictory decisions lacking coherent explana-
tions as to the source of their legal authority. In Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Call Publishing Co.,1 43 the Court considered a complaint
from a company that charged higher rates than its competitor. West-
em Union argued that no law prohibited discriminatory pricing poli-
140. 91 U.S. 270, 273-74 (1875).
141. 149 U.S. 368 (1893).
142. Id. at 378; see Michael Conant, The Commerce Clause, te Supremacy Clause
and the Law Merchant Swift v. Tyson and the Unity of Conmnerical Law, 15 J. Mar. L
& Com. 153, 177 n.127 (1984) (concluding that Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v.
Baugh "creat[ed] a federal common law of torts"). A sharply-worded dissent argues
against the imposition of a general common law rule rather than the rule applied by
the state courts. Baugh, 149 U.S. at 391-411.
143. 181 U.S. 92 (1901).
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cies. The states were precluded from regulating the telegraph business
because of its role in interstate commerce; therefore, the telegraph
company argued, with no congressional statute on point and no fed-
eral common law, the entire field was left unregulated. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, applying the common law rule requiring
equal charges for comparable communication services.
The Western Union decision strongly reaffirmed national control
over interstate commerce, stating that "[t]his court has often held that
the full control over interstate commerce is vested in Congress, and
that it cannot be regulated by the States."' 44 The Court also noted
that prior opinions had stated that "there is no Federal common law
different and distinct from the common law existing in the several
States,'45 quoting at length from its 1888 opinion in Smith v. Ala-
bama.146 "There is no common law of the United States in the sense
of a national customary law distinct from the common law of England
as adopted by the several States, each for itself, applied as its local
law, and subject to such alteration as may be provided by its own stat-
utes.' 1 47 These truisms, however, left the Court in danger of painting
itself-and the country-into the comer so ably constructed by coun-
sel for the telegraph company: If the states could not regulate inter-
state commerce, how could state common law apply to this case?
In constructing an exit from this tight corner, the Court was forced
to define a kind of common law that differed in significant respects
from the general common law. Despite the affirmation of the Smith v.
Alabama holding that there is no federal common law and that gen-
eral common law constitutes state law, 148 the Court proceeded to ap-
ply a national common law that was not subject to state statutory
control.
But it is an entirely different thing to hold that there is no common
law in force generally throughout the United States, and that the
countless multitude of interstate commercial transactions are sub-
ject to no rules and burdened by no restrictions other than those
expressed in the statutes of Congress. 149
144. Id. at 100.
145. Id.
146. 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888).
147. Western Union, 181 U.S. at 101 (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. at 478).
148. Id. "A determination in a given case of [the local common law] may be differ-
ent in a court of the United States from that which prevails in the judicial tribunals of
a particular State... but the law as applied is none the less the law of that State."
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. at 478. The Smith decision, however, stressed the local
health and safety concerns underlying the state rule at issue in that case, a require-
ment that railroad engineers obtain a state license. Smith, therefore, is consistent with
the distinction emerging in Western Union: While local common law is state law, the
federal courts are authorized to apply federal common law to areas requiring national
rules, in the absence of congressional regulation. Id. at 478-79.
149. Western Union, 181 U.S. at 101.
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Defining the common law as "principles and rules of action" culled
from "usages and customs of immemorial antiquity,"'' 5 the Court con-
cluded that common law principles "are operative upon all interstate
commercial transactions except so far as they are modified by Con-
gressional enactment."'' Although phrasing this holding in the terms
of the general common law, the Court stepped outside that framework
in a crucial respect: The common law applicable to interstate com-
merce could be modified only by Congress, not by state statute. 5 2 In
an area subject to exclusive federal control, the Court began to formu-
late would later be recognized as "true" federal common law.
The cases cited by the Court in Western Unio,' 53 pointed out the
ambiguity about the state or federal nature of this common law. The
court cited to one case applying common law principles and public
policy without identifying the applicable norms as state or federal."
The Court, however, also cited Murray v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.,' 55
in which District Judge Shiras offered an exhaustive review of
Supreme Court cases analyzing the common law, concluding that the
federal courts are empowered to develop common law principles gov-
erning "matters of national control." ''  Judge Shiras reasoned that
the Constitution had divided responsibility for various areas or sub-
jects between national and state governments, with the federal gov-
ernment in charge of all "subjects affecting the country or people at
large," while the states were allocated responsibility "over all that are
local, or which do not require a uniform system or law for their proper
regulation."' 57 Within each of these areas, the courts were to apply
the relevant body of law, be it common law or statute, admiralty or
equity: "[E]ach subject carries with it the law or system appropriate
thereto."' 58 In areas of exclusive federal control, the courts were to
apply common law in the absence of congressional directives. In areas
150. Id. at 102 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 232).
151. Id
152. By contrast, under the Swift v. Tyson regime, federal courts applied state stat-
utes to cases governed by state law.
153. Western Union, 181 U.S. at 102-03.
154. In Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co., 93 U.S. 174 (1876), the Court
found a delivery service liable for the negligence of the railroad to which it entrusted
plaintiff's package, despite a bill of lading disclaiming liability. Id. at 182. In formulat-
ing a common law rule, the Court relied on prior Supreme Court cases, as well as
cases from several states and Great Britain. Id. at 180, 184, 186-88. The Western
Union decision also cites a third case, Interstate Conunerce Commission v. Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad Co., 145 U.S. 263 (1892), which relied on custom and analogous
English decisions to interpret the Interstate Commerce Act. Western Union, 181 U.S.
at 102.
155. 62 F. 24 (1894).
156. Id. at 33.
157. Id. at 29.
158. Id. at 32.
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of state control, federal courts applied common law only in the ab-
sence of state regulation: 59
[A]s to all matters of national importance over which paramount
legislative control is conferred upon congress, the courts of the
United States ... have the right to declare what are the rules de-
ductible from the principles of general jurisprudence which control
the given case, and to define the duties and obligation of the parties
thereto.... [T]he binding force of the principles of this common
law, as applied to matters affecting the entire people, and placed
under the control of the national government, is not derived from
the action of the states, and is no more subject to abrogation or
modification by state legislation than are the principles of the law of
nations or of the law maritime.160
Although not labeled "federal common law," the law applied by Judge
Shiras possessed the basic characteristics of such law: It was a product
of the federal courts that supported federal jurisdiction, was binding
on the states, and was independent of state law, be it statutory or
judge-made. In Western Union, the Court shied away from the full
implication of its citation to Murray, denying that the common law
principles it applied constituted "a body of law distinct from the com-
mon law enforced in the States. ' 16' Despite this denial, the Court
clearly applied a body of law with characteristics different from those
of the general common law qua state law.16
By 1916, the Court came one step closer to recognizing the federal
nature of this common law. In Southern Express Co. v. Byers,163 the
Court declared that rights and liabilities in interstate commerce were
governed by "acts of Congress, the bill of lading and common law
principles accepted and enforced by the Federal courts."" Noting
that the state courts had split on whether a carrier was liable for
159. Id. Judge Shiras recognized that the Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Ala-
bama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888), stated that there was no federal common law, but
pointed to the Court's important qualification: The interpretation of the Constitution
and of federal statutes and treaties constituted national common law. He concluded
that this language must be read to authorize application of federal common law prin-
ciples to interstate commerce and other areas within national control. Murray, 62 F. at
33-37.
160. Murray, 62 F. at 42.
161. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 103 (1901).
162. See Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do With Jurisdiction?, 46
Rutgers L. Rev. 1071, 1162-63 (1994) (arguing that both Western Union and Murray
"postulated that the Constitution had implicitly allocated common lawmaking respon-
sibility-sometimes exclusively, sometimes concurrently-between federal and state
courts" (citing Murray, 62 F. at 31-32)). "This postulate involved a new view of the
federal courts' role, in which there would be 'national control over subjects affecting
the country and the people as a whole, and wherein uniformity of rule and control is
desirable, if not indispensable, and ... state control over subjects of local interests."'
Id. Professor Hill sees this line of utility cases as developing federal common law.
Hill, supra note 5, at 1029 n.30.
163. 240 U.S. 612 (1916).
164. Id. at 614.
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mental suffering only, the Court overturned a state court decision
awarding such damages, finding that the "long-recognized common
law rule permitted no recovery." '165 These decisions reflect the tenta-
tive beginnings of federal common law, applicable to areas within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts and binding on the states.
In the absence of a formal recognition of federal court common
lawmaking power, a fundamental problem became increasingly clear:
Issues of national concern, within Congress' power, could not be gov-
erned solely by state law in areas where Congress had not legislated.
Much less did it make sense to allow state statutes to govern, while
applying federal common law. The rationales advanced by the courts
supported national rulemaking, while the still-dominant legal theories
prohibited it."6
B. International Law and the General Common Law
Judge Shiras in Murray used international law as the model for his
incipient federal common law, stating, "The subject-matter of dealing
with other nations is conferred exclusively upon the national govern-
ment, and of necessity all questions arising under the law of nations
... are committed to the national government."'6 7 Clear lines were
difficult during the era governed by Swift v. Tyson. Although interna-
tional law traditionally had been viewed as neither state nor federal,
interpretation and application of international law had been seen as a
federal task. As in cases addressing national commerce and utilities,
the general common law provided an inadequate model, because such
law was neither jurisdiction granting nor binding on the states. De-
spite the confused conceptual foundation, the Supreme Court applied
a consistently federal body of law in some areas and pointed toward
the development of federal common law in others.
In areas such as immigration and naturalization, for example, the
supremacy of federal law had long been recognized."6 Federal
supremacy over these issues rested upon the fundamental allocation
165. Id at 615.
166. The federal courts responded to this tension in part by increasingly finding a
congressional intent to dominate the field, thus authorizing development of federal
common law rules. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17, 18-19 (1920)
(overruling a state court definition of "interstate" commerce and applying a federal
court definition); Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505-06 (1913) (find-
ing that an amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act demonstrated congressional
intent to occupy the field governing liability for loss in shipment and to eliminate "the
uncertainties and diversities of rulings" prevalent before the amendment).
167. Murray, 62 F. at 32.
168. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S.
581 (1889) (upholding federal authority over immigration), Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92
U.S. 275 (1875) (holding unconstitutional a state statute regulating immigration).
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of authority over areas touching upon foreign affairs. 1 69 As the court
noted in Chy Lung, the federal government, not the states, would be
held accountable for problems triggered by the regulation of immigra-
tion, or any other areas touching foreign relations. The federal gov-
ernment, therefore, also had authority over such relations and the
power to bar the states from taking actions for which the nation as a
whole would be held accountable. 171 Chy Lung invalidated a state
statute solely on the basis that it overstepped state powers over
immigration.
Immigration had traditionally been understood to fall into that nar-
row sector governed solely by federal law.171 Thus, the courts had
little difficulty developing a body of federal law governing immigra-
tion, in the absence of congressional authorization, despite the rheto-
ric of no federal common law.
Federal control over admiralty and maritime law had long included
application of international law rules. 172 The supremacy of federal
common law in this area was firmly established in the pre-Erie period
by Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen.1 73 The Court found that through
the grant of federal jurisdiction over "cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction" the Constitution also directed that such cases be gov-
erned by uniform, national law. 7 4 The Court quoted extensively from
an earlier decision that found it "unquestionable" that the Constitu-
tion intended
169. "For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national pur-
poses, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one na-
tion, one power." Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606.
170. If a foreign nation protested over the treatment of its citizens seeking to enter
the United States,
[u]pon whom would such a claim be made? Not upon the State of Califor-
nia; for, by our Constitution, she can hold no exterior relations with other
nations. It would be made upon the government of the United States. If
that government should get into a difficulty which would lead to war, or to
suspension of intercourse, would California alone suffer, or all the Union?
Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 279.
171. "[S]ome kinds of governmental action affect our relations with foreign nations
so intimately and sensitively that they must be deemed to be within the exclusive
competence of the federal government." Hill, supra note 5, at 1048.
172. See cases cited supra notes 120, 122, 124; David J. Bederman, The Feigned
Demise of Prize, 9 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 31, 51-52 (1995) ("[F]rom time immemorial,
when a national court adjudicated a case of a maritime capture it was obliged to fol-
low international law. This is, of course, what gave prize proceedings their legiti-
macy."); see also Berizzi Bros. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (applying
international rules to determine federal court jurisdiction over a commercial vessel
owned by a foreign sovereign); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 545-46, 1
Pet. 388, 414 (1828) (stating that admiralty cases "are as old as navigation itself; and
the law admiralty and maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied by our courts to
the cases as they arise").
173. 244 U.S. 205 (1916).
174. Id. at 214-15.
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a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the
whole country. It certainly could not have been intended to place
the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regula-
tion of the several states, as that would have defeated the uniform-
ity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects
of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the states
with each other or with foreign states.'
75
The Jensen Court invalidated a state statute regulating workers' com-
pensation and applied instead a federal common law rule, despite
Chief Justice Holmes' famous, impassioned dissent.1 76 Although mar-
itime law has evolved from a body of largely customary international
law through extensive codification, 1" federal control remains firmly
entrenched. 78
A handful of cases raising issues of customary international law in
other spheres, however, led to contradictory results. An early case
arising out of the Civil War produced the only Supreme Court state-
ment that interpretation and application of the laws of war, a branch
of international law, did not raise an issue of federal law. In New York
Life Insurance Co. v. Hendren,179 the Court refused to review a state
court decision concerning the effect of the Civil War upon the validity
175. Id. at 215 (quoting The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874)).
176. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 218. The dissent includes Holmes' oft-quoted attack on
common law as a "brooding omnipresence in the sky," see supra note 35, an argument
that was soon adopted by the Court in cases raising state law issues. See Erie R.R_ Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). However, as Prof. Weinberg argues, the issues in
Jensen and other admiralty cases are quite different from those raising state law
questions.
[T]he truth is that, in Jensen, Holmes was wrong. He did not understand that
Jensen, an admiralty case, raised federal, not state, issues, or that the Court,
far from applying the law of a "brooding omnipresence in the sky," had
identified the governing sovereign as the nation.
Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 805, 826 (1989). NVein-
berg proposes that this "misunderstanding" explains the fact that the majority opinion
in Erie cites two other Holmes dissents on this issue, but does not cite his dissent in
Jensen. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 69 n.1 (citing, inter alia, Black & White Taxicab Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Kuhn
v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). "When the
time came for Brandeis to pay intellectual homage to Holmes' role in revealing the
'fallacy' of Swift v. Tyson, Brandeis resorted not to Jensen, but to two of Holmes'
other well-known dissents." Weinberg, supra, at 826.
177. See Henkin, supra note 7, at 1560 n.22 (tracing the development of admiralty
law from a body of international "general maritime law" to congressional codification
of rules applicable to internal waters and private disputes).
178. Since Jensen, the Court has expanded the areas in which state law can apply
without interfering with federal interests and has indicated dissatisfaction with the
inconsistent application of the lines between zones of state and federal control. Steven
F. Friedell, Searching for a Compass: Federal and State Law Making Authority in
Admiralty, 57 La. L. Rev. 825, 840-45 (1997). Nevertheless, the basic premise of fed-
eral common law power has not changed: Maritime law remains today -a species of
judge-made federal common law." Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 116 S.
Ct. 619, 624 (1996).
179. 92 U.S. 286 (1875).
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of a life insurance policy, ruling that the case presented "questions of
general law alone."'180 The Court formulated the issue in the case as
"the effect, under the general public law, of a state of sectional civil
war upon the contract of life insurance," and concluded that applica-
tion of the laws of war did not present a federal question unless it was
contended that they had been "modified or suspended" by the laws of
the United States.18' This strange result was attacked in a dissent,
which argued that the rights and responsibilities of U.S. citizens under
the laws of war, whether based upon "written or unwritten" rules, are
governed by the "laws of the United States. 182
The Hendren decision, however, may be understood as part of the
Court's effort to avoid the flood of cases challenging contracts formed
during the Confederacy. In a series of cases concerning contracts pay-
able in Confederate currency, the Court established that such con-
tracts were valid and raised no federal question if they involved simple
business arrangements, rather than attempts to aid the rebellion.'83
The Supreme Court thus drew a distinction between domestic acts
that were governed by general principles of contract law and therefore
subject to state jurisdiction, and acts of rebellion, subject to federal
jurisdiction. A similar line was observed in a series of cases holding
that, by forming the Confederate government, the states violated the
constitutional prohibition against the formation of alliances or confed-
180. Id. at 286.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 288 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Justice Bradley pointed out that the case
also raised a federal question as to the legal effect on private obligations of a war
conducted by the United States government. Id. at 287-88.
183. The Supreme Court denied that the validity of a contract payable in Confeder-
ate currency presented a federal question, where such claims could be resolved on the
basis of "general principles by which courts determine whether a consideration is
good or bad ... [and which] we are not authorized to review." Delmas v. Insurance
Co., 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 661, 666 (1871). Relegating the issue to the category of general
common law, the Court said, "Like in many other questions of the same character, the
Federal courts and the State courts, each within their own spheres, deciding on their
own judgment, are not amenable to each other." Id.
As explained in a line of cases addressing the validity of Confederate contracts,
Delmas raised no federal question because it involved a standard contract question.
not a question of constitutional or international law. The Court carefully distin-
guished cases involving contracts payable in Confederate currency when that was the
only means of exchange permitted by the secessionist states, as in Thorington v.
Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1, 7-12 (1868), from those where the contract was voluntarily
designed to assist the unconstitutional Confederate cause, as in Hanauer v. Woodruff,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 439, 449 (1872) (invalidating a contract payable in war bonds and
distinguishing Thorington due to "the difference between ... submitting to a force
which could not be controlled, and voluntarily aiding to create that force"). The latter
category, including contracts in which "the parties intended, in the payments that
were made, to aid the rebellion," did raise federal questions. Dugger v. Bocock, 104
U.S. 596, 603 (1881); see New Orleans Water-Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co.,
125 U.S. 18, 28-39 (1888) (explaining the jurisdictional questions at issue in these
cases).
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erations.' 84 As a result, all acts by the Confederate Congress violated
the Constitution and challenges to those acts did raise federal
questions. 85
Over forty years later, the Court faced a series of cases challenging
the validity of acts committed by the rebel forces in Mexico. In Oetjen
v. Central Leather Co.,186 the Court accepted jurisdiction over a case
challenging the legal effect of the seizure of property by a rebel army
in Mexico. The plaintiff claimed ownership of a shipment of leather
hides confiscated by forces under the command of General Francisco
(Pancho) Villa.187 By the time the case reached the Supreme Court,
the U.S. executive branch had recognized the insurgent government.
On appeal from the decision of the New Jersey state courts, the
Supreme Court recognized the issue as a federal question supporting
federal jurisdiction."8 The Court held that the subsequent recogni-
tion of the revolutionary Mexican government by the executive
branch rendered the seizure a public act of a foreign sovereign, and
thus not subject to challenge under the act of state doctrine."8 9
184. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation .... ").
185. Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594 (1878); Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176 (1877).
Both cases apply principles of international law to determine which acts of a de facto
regime should be considered valid. Ford, 97 U.S at 611-12; Williams, 96 U.S. at 184-92.
186. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
187. Id. at 299.
188. The Court first rejected application of a treaty, the Hague Convention of 1907,
finding that it applied only to international conflicts and, in any event, had not been
violated. Id at 301-02. But the Court declined to rest its decision on the treaty analy-
sis, stating that, "[S]ince claims similar to the one before us are being made in many
cases in this and in other courts, we prefer to place our decision upon the application
of three clearly settled principles of law .... Id. at 302. The Court then proceeded to
enunciate and apply the act of state doctrine. Id. at 302-04.
189. Id at 302-03. Under a jurisdictional statute in effect from 1922 to 1928, the
Supreme Court held that a district court decision granting sovereign immunity did not
present a federal question requiring direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Wulfson v.
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 266 U.S. 580 (1924). The statute, Act of
Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 305, 42 Stat. 837, repealed by Act of Jan. 31, 1928, ch. 14, § 1, 45
Stat. 54, required direct appeal to the Supreme Court where "the jurisdiction of the
District Court as a federal court" was at issue. Smyth v. Asphalt Belt Ry. Co., 267
U.S. 326,327 (1925). Where a district court dismissed a case on jurisdictional grounds
that did not challenge the federal court's authority to hear the case, however, a stan-
dard appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals was proper. Id. at 327-28; see Oliver Am.
Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440, 442 (1924) (holding that direct appeal to the
Supreme Court is required "whenever there is in controversy the power of the court,
as defined or limited by the Constitution or statutes of the United States, to hear and
determine the cause"). In Oliver, the federal court had the power to hear the case
under diversity jurisdiction; the district court applied principles of sovereign immunity
to dismiss the case against Mexico. Oliver, 264 U.S. at 441-42. The Supreme Court
held that this application of the "general law" of sovereign immunity did not trigger
direct appeal to that Court. Id. at 442-43. Given that federal jurisdiction over the case
was not at issue, this result was proper under the governing statute. See Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 274 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1927) (finding no
jurisdictional issue triggering direct appeal where a district court is vested with juris-
diction pursuant to diversity of citizenship).
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These contradictory results reflect the tensions of an era in which
the governing legal theory provided no explanation for the existence
of federal common law, at the same time that the need for such law
became increasingly pressing. At the time of the drafting of the Con-
stitution, the framers saw international law as neither state nor fed-
eral, a view that maintained vigor throughout the nineteenth century.
The framers were confident that they could protect the nation's inter-
national law obligations by assigning jurisdiction over such cases to
the federal courts. By the beginning of the twentieth century, this
structure no longer worked. Fears of federal despotism had produced
rulings flatly denying the possibility of federal common law, while
general common law had acquired the attributes of state law-neither
jurisdiction-granting nor supreme over state judicial decisions and
subject to override by the state legislatures.
The tensions arising from the attempt to apply a general common
law model to resolve issues of national concern produced a complex
and at times contradictory body of case law. Some commentators re-
solved the contradiction by concluding that general common law rules
enunciated by the federal courts were binding on the states, 90 a solu-
In a later case, however, the Court cited the Oliver decision in dismissing an appeal
from a state court involving a question of sovereign immunity. Wulfsohn, 266 U.S. at
580. This unexplained citation and the refusal to hear the Wulfsohn appeal indicated
a view that issues of sovereign immunity are not governed by federal law and do not
trigger federal question jurisdiction. See Weisburd, supra note 10, at 39-40. This result
is difficult to reconcile with the oft-repeated language about foreign relations and the
federal government: Decisions as to the immunity of a foreign government or its
representatives are at least as likely as immigration disputes to provoke problems
between this country and other nations, and the government liable for any violations
is, clearly, the federal government. As noted by Professor Weisburd in an article
otherwise critical of federal judicial lawmaking, Oliver seems wrongly decided be-
cause it addresses "the formal relations between the United States and another gov-
ernment in that government's capacity as a sovereign entity." Id. at 40 n.247.
Focusing on jurisdictional questions, the Court ignored the federalism issues raised by
the cases. Id.
Some years later, Justice Frankfurter criticized the "contradictory and confusing"
rulings on sovereign immunity issued by the New York courts, including the Wulfsohn
decision. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 236 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Frankfurter warned that application of local rules to transactions "entangled in inter-
national significance," id. at 238, would frustrate U.S. foreign policy. Id. at 236-42. "In
our dealings with the outside world, the United States speaks with one voice and acts
as one, unembarrassed by the complications as to domestic issues which are inherent
in the distribution of political power between the national government and the indi-
vidual states." Id. at 242.
190. Various theories were proposed to explain this result. Justice Story, for exam-
ple, "seems to have thought" that general common law rules addressing "general"
(rather than "local") issues "were applying general 'federal law,"' not state law.
Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 391-92 n.45 (1964). Other commentators accepted that federal
common law addressed issues of state law, but viewed federal court decisions on such
issues as binding on state courts. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 84, at 12-13; Henry
Schofield, Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-Made State Law in State and Federal
Courts, 4 Ill. L. Rev. 533, 546 (1910).
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tion clearly rejected by the Supreme Court in Delmas v. Insurance
Co. 191 Nevertheless, in areas demanding formulation of national
rules, the courts proceeded to develop what can only be called federal
common law. 192
The status of international law was particularly problematic, given
the pressing need for uniformity and the federal government's ac-
countability for any violations of international norms. In practice, this
system avoided more serious ramifications largely because the state
courts generally followed the Supreme Court's lead on those interna-
tional issues in which the Court chose not to intervene.1 93 Sprout,
writing in 1932, summarized the confusion regarding international
law, concluding that the conflicting views expressed in the federal de-
cisions were irreconcilable. 194
191. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 661 (1871). Schofield vehemently criticized the Delmas
holding. Schofield, supra note 190, at 544-48.
192. The Restatement (Third) states that, during this pre-Erie time period, federal
and state courts reached independent decisions regarding international law and that
such decisions in the state courts were not subject to Supreme Court review. Restate-
ment (Third), supra note 7, pt. I, ch. 2, introductory note at 41. As we have seen, this
model was followed in some areas, but not in others. Further, it is consistent with the
view that international law was neither federal nor state law, but general law applied
equally by both. As the theoretical framework justifying non-federal, non-state law
was replaced with a predominantly positivist approach, the problem of classification
became more urgent, but was not conclusively resolved until the decision in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See discussion infra Part I1.C.
193. Hill, supra note 5, at 1042-59. For example, New York cases evaluating the
impact of Soviet property confiscations followed Supreme Court guidance. See, e.g.,
Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 193 N.E. 897 (N.Y. 1934) (applying the
Supreme Court holding in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918), to find
that subsequent recognition of the Soviet government rendered prior actions the pub-
lic acts of a sovereign government); M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 186 N.E.
679 (N.Y. 1933) (interpreting international law consistently with Supreme Court hold-
ings on point); see also Schulz v. Raimes, 164 N.Y.S. 454 (1917) (allowing an enemy
alien to sue in state courts in the absence of federal legislative or executive guidance
to the contrary). State court decisions evaluating the impact of the Mexican revolu-
tion on property rights followed Supreme Court guidance; but, although some did so
as a legal obligation, others did not. Compare Monte Blanco Real Estate Corp. v.
Wolvin Line, 85 So. 242 (La. 1920) (following Supreme Court holdings as to the rele-
vance of the United States' recognition of the new Mexican government and act of
state doctrine) wid Cia. Minera Ygnacio Rodriquez Ramos v. Bartlesville Zinc Co.,
275 S.W. 388 (Tex. 1925) (following Supreme Court rulings, but implying that state
courts have the right to determine law independently).
194. Sprout, supra note 68, at 292. Sprout began his article with a truism: -Every
student of international law knows that the federal courts in the United States apply
rules derived from international law." Id. at 280. He then explored several theories to
explain this result. Id. at 280-88. He concluded that the courts failed to distinguish
between international law as a body of law independent of the municipal law of any
nation and international law in some more general sense as a set of topics that have
international overtones, but upon which local governments may legislate.
[F]ederal courts... have treated international law as a branch of the munici-
pal common law, and hence as State law. Yet these same courts have distin-
guished, in a great variety of instances, between the subject-matter of these
two bodies of law, between the parties whose legal relations are defined by
each, and between the sources of the authority of their respective rules and
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It is not surprising that these questions of state and federal lawmak-
ing powers produced confused holdings. During the nineteenth cen-
tury, basic issues of federal-state powers had been called into
question.' 95 Even the supremacy of congressional statutes was chal-
lenged: As late as 1858, a state attempted to block federal court en-
forcement of a federal statute, the Fugitive Slaves Act. 196 In 1860, the
Court held that federal courts did not have the power to order state
courts to comply with constitutionally mandated extradition re-
quests. 197 In overruling the decision over 100 years later, the Court
noted that at the time Dennison was decided, "the practical power of
the Federal government [was] at its lowest ebb since the adoption of
the Constitution.' 19 The nation soon thereafter descended into the
Civil War, fought, in part, over conflicting views of federalism. 99 Put-
ting the pieces back together again and resolving issues raised by the
post-war constitutional amendments occupied the Court for many de-
cades thereafter.2 °
This was the confused body of case law and commentary upon
which Erie set to work, triggering a decades-long process of working
principles. The only possible conclusion seems to be either that the courts
have been hopelessly inconsistent in this matter, or that they have distin-
guished, perhaps without conscious realization of the fact, between interna-
tional law considered merely as a legal subject-matter constituting a branch
of municipal jurisprudence, and international law considered as an in-
dependent legal system beyond the ambit of municipal law.
Id. at 292.
195. During the seventy years following the ratification of the Constitution, the fed-
eral and state governments repeatedly clashed over the extent of their overlapping
powers, with frequent state efforts to resist or nullify federal enactments. See generally
John J. Gibbons, Federal Law and the State Courts, 1790-1860, 36 Rutgers L. Rev. 399
(1984) (reviewing many disparate examples of state court refusals to enforce federal
law).
196. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858). For many years, states'
rights advocates argued that the states had the right, under the Constitution, to refuse
to enforce federal statutes that they believed violative of the Constitution. See Gib-
bons, supra note 195, at 416-18 (discussing the debates over these issues). With more
success, the Southern states successfully blocked congressional interference with slav-
ery in the territories. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). In 1947, the
Supreme Court was forced to reiterate the supremacy of federal legislation when the
Rhode Island state courts refused to enforce the federal price control statute, labeling
it the penal statute of a foreign state. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
197. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860).
198. Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 225 (1987).
199. See generally Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the
Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863, 872 (1986) (asserting
that the "fundamental constitutional issue central to the Civil War [was] whether ulti-
mate sovereignty was constitutionally delegated to the national or to the state
governments").
200. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early
Implementation of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 Colum. L. Rev.
1515, 1596-99 (1986) (describing the tensions undermining judicial independence dur-
ing the post-war period).
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out which areas of the old general common law constituted state law,
and which federal.
III. THE TRANSFORMATION TO FEDERAL COMMON LAW
The significance of the language used by the Supreme Court in The
Paquete Habana-"international law is part of our law"-must be un-
derstood in light of this confused history of the general common law,
state law, and the emerging federal common law. Overnight, Erie re-
structured the relationship between state and federal law and state
and federal courts. Dozens of decisions were either implicitly over-
ruled or rendered of little or no precedential value. At the same time,
many other decisions suddenly found their rightful place in constitu-
tional history, for Erie also afforded a new significance to cases that
had foreshadowed the development of federal common law. As Erie
made possible the development of true federal common law, the
courts built upon the foundation laid by cases decided under the pre-
Erie general common law rubric."' Not only did the Supreme Court
hold that international law cases are governed by federal common
law, it did so by citing cases such as The Paquete Habana, clarifying
that in the international law context, "our law" is and was federal, not
state, law.
A. Erie and Federal Common Law
By the time of the Erie decision, the problems with the Swift v. Ty-
son 2°2 regime were well-documented. State courts repeatedly de-
201. Bradley and Goldsmith reassert their simplified view of the eighteenth and
nineteenth century status of customary international law in their article in this vol-
ume. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Ilegitiinacy of International
Human Rights Litigation, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 319, 331-36 (1997). They correctly list
several points on which we agree. As to the early historical stages of our debate, for
example, we apparently agree that the framers were deeply committed to the judicial
enforcement of international law, but that the Constitution does not specifically artic-
ulate the means by which they expected such law to be enforced. I review this history
at length, however, to demonstrate the framers' view that such a reference was not
necessary because international law would be enforced by the federal courts as an
obligation of the new nation--enforced as a result of a choice-of-law analysis, not as a
result of an explicit jurisdictional grant.
This approach, although both functional and theoretically consistent in the early
decades of our history, encountered difficult structural problems in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century. Thus, while we three agree that the Supreme
Court pre-Erie categorized customary international law as general common law, they
attribute too much significance to this label. As they acknowledge, some of the pre-
Erie general common law cases are now understood to have applied federal common
law. Although the analytic framework of the time did not call such law "federal,"
modern Supreme Court decisions have recharacterized that pre-Erie law as federal
law. Bradley and Goldsmith continue to misinterpret the significance of this body of
precedent, because they impose upon it the labels and concepts of their late-twentieth
century view of federalism, leading to a cramped misreading of a complex
jurisprudence.
202. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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clined to follow the rules of general law adopted by the federal courts,
creating exactly the disparities Swift had hoped to prevent.2 0 3 The
sheer volume of litigation across the country rendered the Supreme
Court incapable of offering guidance in the vast majority of cases. 0 4
The injustice and unforeseeability of a system in which substantive
rules turned on the fortuity of diversity of citizenship undermined re-
spect for the law and presented a hurdle for the expansion of national
commercial ventures.20 5 With the gradual erosion of belief in the
common law as a body of natural law independent of sovereign au-
thority, the general common law was vulnerable to derisive criticisms
such as Justice Holmes' reference to "a brooding omnipresence in the
sky."
2 0 6
Unfortunately, when the Court seized the opportunity to unravel
the knots created by almost a century of the general common law, its
murky decision left unresolved the scope of the federal courts' re-
maining common law powers. The uncertain constitutional analysis of
Erie provided several generations of scholars ammunition for widely
divergent views: the federal courts have no common law powers,20 7
the common lawmaking powers of the federal courts are as extensive
as those of Congress, 0 8 and almost every variation in between.0 9
203. Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure 193-94 (2d ed. 1993).
204. Friendly, supra note 190, at 405 ("The growth of the country multiplied the
nation's judicial business far beyond the capacity of any single court to preserve uni-
formity by the force of example."). In 1875, Congress authorized federal jurisdiction
over cases arising under federal law, Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470,
(currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)), thus increasing the caseload of the
federal courts and curtailing the Supreme Court's ability to review cases arising under
state law. The federal courts' caseload also increased dramatically with the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the explosion of federal legislation in the 1930s.
Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 881, 901-02 (1986); Friendly, supra note 190, at 406.
205. See supra notes 143-62 and accompanying text (discussing the importance at-
tributed to national rules governing national affairs by Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.
v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893), and Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Call Publishing
Co., 181 U.S. 92 (1901)).
206. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
207. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and
the Interpretive Process: An "Institutional" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 761 (1989)
(arguing that federal courts have no power to make common law). As others have
noted, this view has little support in the literature or the case law. See Brown, supra
note 209, at 248 (stating that Redish "has not convinced anyone else" of his views).
208. See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 176 (arguing that federal court power to make
common law extends to all areas within the federal government's control). Professor
Weinberg, the main proponent of the view that the federal courts have common law-
making powers coextensive with the legislative powers of Congress, see Weinberg,
supra note 176, at 813 ("The judiciary must have presumptive power to adjudicate
whatever the legislature and the executive can act upon."), acknowledges that her
views have not been accepted. Id. at 806.
209. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Federal Common Law and the Role of the Federal
Courts in Private Law Adjudication, A (New) Erie Problem, 12 Pace L. Rev. 229, 252-
57 (1992) (providing a summary of various approaches); Field, supra note 204, at 924-
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Despite these contradictory views, a discernible middle ground has
emerged that rejects the two extremes while agreeing on the basic
premise: Federal courts do have the power to develop federal com-
mon law, but only in the limited areas authorized by the Constitution
or congressional enactment.210 That Erie permits development of fed-
eral common law is xvidely accepted. 11 Indeed, judicial decision-mak-
ing would be virtually impossible without some room for lawmaking.
Statutes, after all, as well as the Constitution, must be interpreted and
applied to new and unexpected situations. 12
Also widely accepted, however, is the view that federal court law-
making power is neither unlimited nor as wide-ranging as that of Con-
gress.21 3 Both separation of powers and federalism constraints require
that federal courts limit their potentially intrusive lawmaking to areas
in which such powers have been authorized by the Constitution or by
statute. Such was the holding of Erie, in the oft-quoted line, "Except
in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Con-
gress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State."2 4
This recognition of distinct state and federal spheres of authority, gov-
27 (concluding that Erie is ambiguous as to the extent of federal court lawmaking
power and the possible limits on that power); Kramer, supra note 2, at 264-65.
210. See Brown, supra note 209, at 252-54.
211. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 744 (4th ed. 1996) ("There is no longer serious dispute that the body
of federal law legitimately includes judge-made law .... ").
212. The Supreme Court recognized early on that judicial decisions interpreting the
Constitution, treaties, and statutes constituted a body of federal common law. Smith
v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478-79 (1888) (holding that interpretation of the Constitu-
tion and of federal statutes and treaties constituted national common law).
Professor Kramer has cogently explained the need for some common law through
statutory interpretation:
[Why let courts make common law in a representative democracy? In part,
the answer must be that judge-made law is unavoidable. That is, courts must
make a certain amount of common law simply because there is no clear line
between 'making' and 'applying' law, between commands that are clear on
the face of a statute and those made through an exercise of judgment and
creativity. Deciding individual cases thus generates some common law be-
cause the process of adjudication necessarily entails articulating rules to
elaborate and clarify the meaning and operation of statutory texts.
Kramer, supra note 2, at 269. Even Martin Redish, arguing that the federal courts are
barred from all federal common lawmaking, recognizes that the "textual or historical
ambiguity" of some statutes will require "judicial resolution on the basis of the court's
own assessment of the competing social and political policies" underlying the legisla-
tion. Redish, supra note 207, at 768.
213. See Fallon et al., supra note 211, at 757 ("Most judges and commentators be-
lieve that the federal courts' power to fashion law is considerably more limited than
that of Congress."). The Supreme Court has consistently so held. See, e.g., Texas In-
dus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) ("[T]he Court has recog-
nized the need and authority in some limited areas to formulate what has come to be
known as 'federal common law."'); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)
(stating that areas in which federal common law is authorized are "few and
restricted").
214. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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erned by the law-statutory or decisional-of the appropriate sover-
eign, is one of the lasting strengths of the Erie decision. As Judge
Friendly explained in his famous 1964 article, Erie straightened out
the roles of state and federal law in a manner that was "so beautifully
simple, and so simply beautiful" as to seem both obvious and long
overdue.21 5 State law-statutory or decisional-was to control state
issues. Federal law-statutory or decisional-was to control federal
issues and was to be binding on the states. 216
Within this middle ground, the ongoing debate centers on the de-
gree of constitutional or statutory authorization necessary to permit
federal court lawmaking. There is little dispute over federal court de-
velopment of common law where explicitly authorized by the Consti-
tution or Congress.21 7 Moreover, both the Supreme Court and many
commentators have recognized "enclaves" of federal authority where
common lawmaking is implicitly authorized.218 The structure of the
Constitution strongly supports the view that federal courts are author-
ized to develop federal common law where necessary to carry out the
assigned responsibilities of the federal government.
The Supreme Court's view that Erie permits federal court lawmak-
ing in areas constitutionally committed to the federal government be-
came clear in a decision issued the same day as Erie, addressing a
conflict between private parties over water rights ceded by one state
to another.2 19 The Supreme Court applied "federal common law" to
215. Friendly, supra note 190, at 422.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 642 ("Federal common law also may come
into play when Congress has vested jurisdiction in the federal courts and empowered
them to create governing rules of law."); National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) ("The legislative history [of the Sherman Act] makes
it perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the statute's
broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition."); Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (holding that the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act empowers the courts to develop a common law of labor-management rela-
tions); see also Brown, supra note 209, at 253 (discussing delegated authority to make
law); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Power of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1, 43-46 (1985) (stating that federal judicial lawmaking is appropriate if authority
has been either expressly or impliedly delegated). Although the finding that such a
delegation has occurred may be debated, the power to so delegate is rarely
challenged.
218. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 209, at 252-53 (federal common lawmaking au-
thorized in "a limited number of enclaves").
219. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
Hinderlider involved a dispute over rights to the waters in the La Plata River, which
flowed south from the mountains of Colorado into New Mexico. Id. at 97. An 1898
Colorado court proceeding awarded the La Plata Ditch Company the right to divert a
set amount of water from the river. Id. at 98. In 1925, however, Congress approved a
Compact between New Mexico and Colorado in which the two states agreed to ap-
portion the flow of the river between them during the months when the river's flow
was inadequate to meet the needs of all users in both states. Id. at 96-97. As a result
of this agreement and in order to guarantee New Mexico its share of the river flow,
the Colorado State Engineer periodically blocked the flow of water to the Ditch Coin-
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resolve the case: "For whether the water of an interstate stream must
be apportioned between the two States is a question of 'federal com-
mon law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either
State can be conclusive." 0 In support of the application of federal
common law, the Court cited pre-Erie cases that had relied on "inter-
state" common law without labeling it state or federal.
Hinderlider thus clarified several aspects of the post-Erie status of
the federal common law. First, the Court recognized that the federal
courts' power to develop common law survived Erie. Quoting the
powerful words of Justice Holmes, Erie vehemently rejected the exist-
ence of "a transcendental body of law outside any particular State,"
insisting that all law be tied to "some definitive authority behind it."2 1
The application of federal common law in Hinderlider made clear that
the Court was not rejecting the entire concept of federal court law-
making, but rather the particular kind developed under the rubric of
Swift v. Tyson and the general common law. Common law tied to a
"definitive authority" survived, whether the authority of a state or of
the federal sovereign. Erie's positivism did not reject all federal court
lawmaking, but only common lawmaking in areas not within the pow-
ers of those courts.
Second, the federal common law developed in Hinderlider was rec-
ognized as jurisdiction-granting and its application presented a federal
question.' 2 In this suit between private parties, the Court based juris-
diction not on the interstate compact,' - but rather on the state court's
failure to follow "federal common law" doctrines governing equitable
distribution of water between the states." 4 Third, Hinderlider relied
on cases decided before Erie, cases that appeared to apply the general
common law, but which, with the hindsight of Erie, are now under-
stood to have applied federal common law.'
Finally, Hinderlider recognized an area of permissible federal com-
mon law authority that grows out of the structure of the Constitution,
not an explicit constitutional authorization. Although the federal
courts are allotted jurisdiction over disputes between the states, the
pany. Id. at 99. In a suit by the Ditch Company. the Colorado Supreme Court held
that the Compact improperly interfered with the Ditch Company's right to a certain
amount of the river flow and ordered a halt to any interference with the company's
water rights. Id.
220. Id. at 110.
221. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J.. dissenting)).
222. Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 110; see Hill, supra note 5. at 1075-76.
223. The Court had long held that an interstate compact is not a -treaty or statute
of the United States" within the meaning of the Judicial Code and thus not a basis for
an appeal to the Supreme Court. Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 109-10 (citing People v.
Central R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 455, 456 (1870)).
224. Id. at 110.
225. See Weisburd, supra note 10, at 41 n.248 (describing Hinderlider as "re-
characterizing [the] general law issue of Kansas as [a] federal common law issue").
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Court did not rely on this jurisdictional grant to justify the develop-
ment of federal common law, but rather the needs of the federal sys-
tem of government. The justification for federal common lawmaking
in Hinderlider was structural: Given that the United States is com-
posed of fifty equal states with discrete legal systems, disputes be-
tween states must be governed by federal law, not by the law of any
particular state. 2 6 Further, the needs of the nation as a whole may
require application of uniform rules distinct from those in effect in the
states party to the dispute. 27
In the absence of a governing positive enactment, the federal courts
thus must develop and apply federal common law to uniquely federal
problems. As reaffirmed more recently by the Supreme Court,
[A] few areas, involving "uniquely federal interests," are so commit-
ted by the Constitution and the laws of the United States to federal
control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary,
by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory di-
rective) by the courts - so-called "federal common law." 228
Cases implicating foreign relations constitute one of these areas in
which the structure of the U.S. government requires that federal law
govern,2 29 a topic central to the questions addressed in this article, and
to which I now turn.
B. Foreign Affairs, International Law, and Federal Common Law
Control over foreign affairs in our federal system is assigned to the
federal government, the only entity recognized internationally as a
sovereign state. The Supreme Court acknowledged federal supremacy
over foreign affairs shortly before Erie, in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 3 in which Justice Sutherland reasoned that
"the powers of external sovereignty" were "vested in the federal gov-
ernment as necessary concomitants of nationality. ' '231 The Constitu-
tion, Sutherland concluded, was based upon the "irrefutable postulate
that though the states were several their people in respect of foreign
affairs were one. '' 232 Despite extensive criticism of Curtiss-Wright's
226. Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 110; see cases cited supra notes 212-18.
227. See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931).
228. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (citation omitted).
229. The power to regulate relations among the states and the power to control
relations with foreign States are both necessary attributes of a federal government.
"The two fundamental requirements of a federal union are that it be able to avoid
internal rupture by settling disputes of its component parts and that it be able to act in
a unified fashion, as a nation, when it faces abroad." Note, The Federal Common Law,
82 Harv. L. Rev. 1512, 1520 (1969).
230. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
231. Id. at 318.
232. Id. at 317.
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historical analysis, its holding as to federal supremacy over foreign af-
fairs reflects basic principles of federalism.1 3
The Court has frequently used similar principles to explain post-
Erie federal supremacy over issues touching upon foreign affairs. In
Hines v. Davidowitz,- 4 for example, the Court held unconstitutional a
state statute requiring aliens to carry registration cards. The Court
relied upon the supremacy of federal authority over "the general field
of foreign affairs," of which immigration and related issues are just
one example, a supremacy to which the Court has "given continuous
recognition." 5
The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective in-
terests of the forty-eight states, is entrusted with full and exclusive
responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties.
"For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for
national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we
are but one people, one nation, one power."[ - 6] Our system of
government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and
states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation,
imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting for-
eign relations be left entirely free from local interference. As Mr.
Justice Miller well observed of a California statute burdening immi-
gration: "If [the United States] should get into a difficulty which
would lead to war, or to suspension of intercourse, would California
alone suffer, or all the Union?"2 7
Similar statements were made in cases evaluating the effect on state
property laws of federal diplomatic agreements,238 perhaps most fa-
mously by Justice Sutherland in U.S. v. Belmont- "In respect of all
international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign
233. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution 94 (1990)
(detailing the "withering criticism" of Curtiss-Wright's historical analysis); see also
Henkin, supra note 18, at 19 (noting that "challenging [Justice Sutherland's] history
does not necessarily destroy his constitutional doctrine"). Henkin notes that, despite
its weaknesses, Curtiss-Wright "has been cited with approval in later cases, and re-
mains authoritative doctrine." Id. at 20. "Whatever the theory, then, there is virtually
nothing related to foreign affairs that is beyond the constitutional powers of the fed-
eral government." hI. at 21.
234. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
235. Id. at 62.
236. Id. at 63 (quoting The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889); 2
Memoir, Correspondence and Miscellanies from the Papers of Thomas Jefferson 230
(1829); The Federalist No. 42 (James Madison)).
237. Hines, 312 U.S. at 63-64 (citing Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1875))
(additional citations omitted).
238. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("We repeat that there are
limitations on the sovereignty of the States. No State can rewrite our foreign policy to
conform to its own domestic policies. Power over external affairs is not shared by the
States; it is vested in the national government exclusively.").
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relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the
State of New York does not exist.
239
Federal supremacy over foreign relations also requires federal
supremacy over the interpretation of international law. Judge Jessup
pointed this out in 1939, just one year after the Erie decision:2 40
The duty to apply [international law] is one imposed upon the
United States as an international person. The several states of the
Union are entities unknown to international law. It would be as
unsound as it would be unwise to make our state courts our ultimate
authority for pronouncing the rules of international law.24 1
As Jessup recognized, although pre-Erie decisions addressing interna-
tional law left unclear the federal status of such law, the logic of the
federal/state legal divide indicated that customary international law
was federal law, not state law.242
The Supreme Court resolved the issue in 1964, twenty-five years
after Jessup's article,2 43 in its landmark decision in Banco Nacional de
239. 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); see Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 304-07; 332-36 (dis-
cussing the exclusion of states from foreign affairs powers); Henkin, supra note 18, at
13.
Foreign affairs are national affairs. The United States is a single nation-state
and it is the United States (not the states of the Union, singly or together)
that has relations with other nations; and the United States Government
(not the governments of the states) conducts those relations and makes na-
tional foreign policy.
Id.
240. Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to Inter-
national Law, 33 Am. J. Int'l L. 740 (1939).
241. Id. at 743; see Koh, supra note 7, at 2362-66.
242. Given the confusing set of precedents decided under the rubric of the general
common law, one of the tasks after Erie was to recategorize common law doctrines
previously lumped together as general common law, specifying which of the earlier
holdings addressed issues of state common law and which addressed federal common
law. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (holding
that the U.S. government's right to collect on a check governed by "federal law
merchant" developed under Swift v. Tyson, rather than by local Pennsylvania law);
Friendly, supra, note 190, at 408-21 (providing additional examples). Friendly con-
cludes, "[A] not insignificant part of Story's 'general law' is already under the sway of
the new type of federal common law .... " Friendly, supra note 190, at 421.
243. In the interim, one lower federal court decision addressed the issue. Bergman
v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948). Bergman considered the claim to immunity
of a French diplomat on his way to an assignment in Bolivia. While in transit through
New York, De Sieyes was served on a state claim, which he then removed to federal
court. Judge Learned Hand held that, because the defendant was served while the
case was in the state court, New York law governed the validity of service and any
claims as to diplomatic immunity. Bergman concluded that New York law on the
issue was not clear and resolved the question through an analysis of international law,
stating that it was conducting the analysis that the New York courts would have done.
Id. at 361-63. But see Clark, supra note 62, at 1317-21 (criticizing Judge Hand's rea-
soning); Henkin, supra note 7, at 1558-59 (same).
Bergman has been cited for its holding that state law governed diplomatic immu-
nity. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 828, 834; Brilmayer, supra note
5, at 302 n.18; Alfred T. Goodwin, International Law in the Federal Courts, 20 Cal, W.
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Cuba v. Sabbatino.24 Sabbatino held that disputes involving foreign
affairs and international law are governed by federal common law in
the absence of controlling legislative or executive branch actions. The
Court based this holding upon pillars of both separation of powers
and federalism: Separation of powers requires judicial deference to
the political branches of government, while federalism mandates that
federal law govern issues affecting foreign affairs. The two are, of
course, closely intertwined, both addressing the federal government's
need to limit the players involved in the foreign policy arena, so that
the U.S. government can implement a coherent foreign policy. Thus,
the legislative and executive branches can order the judicial branch to
follow their lead, while the federal government as a whole orders the
states off the field entirely. Since Sabbatino addressed exactly the is-
sue at the heart of this article, the decision will be discussed in some
detail.
In Sabbatino, the Cuban government sought to collect payment for
a shipment of sugar expropriated from a corporation largely owned by
U.S. residents. Representatives of the original owners argued that the
expropriation violated international law, and that U.S. courts should
therefore refuse to recognize the Cuban government's claim. Cuba
asserted that, because the expropriation was a public act committed
by a sovereign state within its own borders, the courts were barred
from examining the validity of the expropriation under the act of state
doctrine. 45 With the case in federal court on the basis of diversity
Int'l LJ. 157, 161 n.23 (1989-90); Alfred Paul LeBlanc, Jr., United States v. Alvarez-
Machain and the Status of International Law in American Courts, 53 La. L Rev. 1411,
1469 n.224 (1993). But see Clark, supra note 62. at 1317-19 (emphasizing the impor-
tance of Bergman's recognition that "deferring to state court 'interpretation [s] of in-
ternational law' might interfere with federal authority" (citation omitted)).
Bergman's conclusion that New York law controlled the immunity issue, however, was
qualified by a significant disclaimer: "Whether an avowed refusal to accept a well-
established doctrine of international law, or a plain misapprehension of it, would pres-
ent a federal question we need not consider, for neither is present here." Bergman,
170 F.2d at 361. Bergman thus begs the key question: Is New York, or any other
state, free to follow its own interpretations of international law, or are the states
bound to follow federal judge-made law on such issues? Judge Hand concludes only
that New York law controls when it does not disagree with federal law, reserving
decision about the result in case of a conflict. Despite these qualifications, Professor
Henkin comments that the Bergman decision is "often cited as one of [Holmes'] rare
mistakes." Henkin, supra note 18, at 410 n.21.
244. 76 U.S. 398 (1964).
245. "The act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of
this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign
sovereign power committed within its own territory." Id. at 401. Underhill v. Her-
nandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), first set forth the basic rationale for the doctrine: -Every
sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state,
and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another, done within its own territory." Id. at 252. The act of state doctrine was nar-
rowed in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400
(1990), where the Court found it inapplicable to a suit alleging that a company had
obtained contracts through bribery of Nigerian officials. Id. 409-10. The Court em-
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jurisdiction,24 6 the Court turned first to the issue of what law gov-
erned. Although it appeared that New York followed the federal ap-
proach to the act of state doctrine,247 the Court declined to apply New
York law or to duck the choice-of-law determination. "[W]e are con-
strained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice
regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the Na-
tional Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of
the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect
of federal law."248 The Court then referred directly to the analysis
presented by Jessup:
It seems fair to assume that the Court did not have rules like the act
of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins
[sic]. Soon thereafter, Professor Philip C. Jessup, now a judge of the
International Court of Justice, recognized the potential dangers
were Erie extended to legal problems affecting international rela-
tions. He cautioned that rules of international law should not be
left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations. His
basic rationale is equally applicable to the act of state doctrine.249
The Court addressed directly the precedential value of act of state
cases decided before Erie, cases that had not specified the source of
the applicable law.250 Despite the apparent reliance of those decisions
on general common law, the Sabbatino court found that the act of
state doctrine had been governed by federal law even before Erie,
noting that the earlier cases "used language sufficiently strong and
broad-sweeping to suggest that state courts were not left free to de-
velop their own doctrines (as they would have been had this Court
merely been interpreting common law under Swift v. Tyson,
supra).''z '
Sabbatino also defined the relationship between the act of state
doctrine and international law, a holding that dismayed advocates of
phasized that the doctrine does not bar judicial review of "cases and controversies
that may embarrass foreign governments," but only requires that "the acts of foreign
sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid." Id. at 409; see
Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 443(1) (defining the act of state doctrine in U.S.
law).
246. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421.
247. We could perhaps in this diversity action avoid the question of deciding
whether federal or state law is applicable to this aspect of the litigation. New
York has enunciated the act of state doctrine in terms that echo those of
federal decisions decided during the reign of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 ....
Thus our conclusions might well be the same whether we dealt with this
problem as one of state law or federal law.
Id. at 424-25 (citations omitted). Note that the Court here refers to federal decisions
during the Swift era as determinative of federal law on this issue. Id. at 424.
248. Id. at 425.
249. Id. (citation omitted).
250. Id. at 426.
251. Id.
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the supremacy of international law.5 2 The Court ruled that the act of
state doctrine applied even where the acts in question allegedly vio-
lated international law. In the ongoing debate whether international
law was binding on the political branches of our federal government,
Sabbatino came down in favor of the government's authority to deter-
mine the domestic application of international law. On the federalism
question, however, Sabbatino's answer is clear and explicit: The fed-
eral government controls our relations with the rest of the world, in-
cluding the interpretation of international law. Indeed, the Sabbatino
holding regarding the primacy of the federal political branches also
strengthens the role of the federal judiciary. Sabbatino leaves no
doubt that issues of international law and foreign affairs are federal
questions, requiring uniform federal solutions.
The Supreme Court in Sabbatino thus resolved a question central to
the role of international law in the federal system: Issues affecting
international relations or rules of international law are governed by
federal, not state law. 5 3 In reaching this result, the Court also made
clear that cases decided before Erie, at a time when the courts did not
distinguish between federal and state common law, may nonetheless
have developed rules of law that were supreme over state law. Just as
Hinderlider recharacterized the law applied in pre-Erie decisions con-
cerning interstate borders and water rights as a precursor of federal
common law,2 4 Sabbatino opened the possibility that pre-Erie inter-
national law cases applied a precursor of federal common law. Such
cases must be closely examined to evaluate whether the Court in-
tended that state courts be bound to follow its interpretation of the
applicable law or "left free to develop their own doctrines."
Post-Erie, the Court made clear, such areas of federal supremacy
are common: "We are not without other precedent for a determina-
tion that federal law governs; there are enclaves of federal judge-made
law which bind the States." 5 Examples include enclaves defined by
statute, such as labor-management relations2s6 or those that touch
upon "uniquely federal interests." 7 Just as the Court has fashioned
federal common law in the absence of statutes to govern state disputes
252. See Koh, supra note 7, at 2363 (suggesting that Sabbatino "cast a profound
chill upon the willingness of United States domestic courts to interpret or articulate
norms of international law").
253. In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court ratified the "federal common law of interna-
tional relations." Merrill, supra note 217, at 56 n.238.
254. See supra note 225 (quoting Weisburd's description of Hinderlider as
"recharacterizing [the] general law issue of Kansas as [a] federal common law issue."
Weisburd, supra note 10, at 41 n.248).
255. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
256. Id. (citing Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957)).
257. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 426 (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.. 315 U.S. 447
(1942)).
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over boundaries and water apportionment, federal courts must do so
in the area of international relations, because of the federal interest at
stake. The Court found support for the decision that federal law gov-
erns from the "[v]arious constitutional and statutory provisions...
reflecting a concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with for-
eign nations and indicating a desire to give matters of international
significance to the jurisdiction of federal institutions.- 258
The problems surrounding the act of state doctrine are, albeit for
different reasons, as intrinsically federal as are those involved in
water apportionment or boundary disputes. The considerations
supporting exclusion of state authority here are much like those
which led the Court in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19
[(1947)], to hold that the Federal Government possessed paramount
rights in submerged lands though within the three-mile limit of
coastal States. We conclude that the scope of the act of state doc-
trine must be determined according to federal law.259
The comparison with United States v. California260 is instructive. In a
dispute between the State of California and the federal government
over the control of the seabeds lying within three miles of shore, the
Court found that the protection and control of the three-mile belt
"has been and is a function of national external sovereignty."'26' In
litigation concerning rights to the sea, the Court declared, the federal
government appears in part in "its capacity as a member of the family
of nations, '26 2 for the proper management of the sea "is a question for
consideration among nations as such, and not their separate govern-
mental units. '2 63 The states are no more competent to assert domin-
ion in this area than they are to wage war or otherwise assume
responsibility for national security,26 because "national interests, re-
sponsibility, and therefore national rights are paramount.12 6
258. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427 n.25.
259. Id. at 427 (footnote omitted).
260. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
261. Id. at 34.
262. Id. at 29.
263. Id. at 35.
264. IA]s peace and world commerce are the paramount responsibilities of the
nation, rather than an individual state, so, if wars come, they must be fought
by the nation .... The state is not equipped in our constitutional system with
the powers or the facilities for exercising the responsibilities which would be
concomitant with the dominion which it seeks.
Id. at 35-36 (citing Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1875)).
265. Id. at 36. The states regained control-although not sovereign rights-over
the submerged land at issue in United States v. California in 1953 when Congress
passed the Submerged Lands Acts, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (current version at 43 U.S.C.
§ 1301 et seq. (1995 & Supp. 1997)), which granted the states title to lands "over which
the United States has paramount sovereign rights, beneath a 3-mile belt of the territo-
rial sea[, lands] which would otherwise be held by the United States." United States
v. Alaska, 117 S. Ct. 1888, 1892 (1997).
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By analogy, then, the Supreme Court in Sabbatino placed the act of
state doctrine, as well as other "legal problems affecting international
relations" and "rules of international law,"26 on the same plane as
control over the seabeds and other issues governed by the federal gov-
ernment as a sovereign nation. Such issues must be controlled by fed-
eral law, not "left to divergent and perhaps parochial state
interpretations."267 This choice-of-law decision is central to Sabba-
tino's holding that the act of state doctrine affects our nation's rela-
tionships with other sovereigns and thus must be followed by the
judiciary. Were the act of state doctrine merely a domestic choice-of-
law rule, a state court would be free to apply its own law and might
choose to disregard the doctrine.21 The Supreme Court felt "con-
strained" to decide the choice-of-law issue because the federal nature
of the issue was fundamental to its holding as to the reach of the act of
state doctrine.269
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have not questioned this basic
construct. Shortly after the Sabbatino decision, the Court employed
similar reasoning to declare unconstitutional an Oregon statute that
conditioned inheritance rights on a showing that the foreign heir has a
right under the laws of the home country to receive the proceeds of
the estate "without confiscation. -70 Petitioners, citizens of East Ger-
many, were denied their inheritance on the basis of this requirement.
The Court found the statute to be "an intrusion by the State into the
field of foreign affairs, ' 271 declaring that "foreign affairs and interna-
tional relations" are "matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to
the Federal Government. '2 72 Although probate issues have tradition-
ally been regulated by the states, the Court found that such authority
266. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
267. Id
268. Had the Court merely applied New York law in this diversity case, the ruling
would not have been binding on the courts of any other state.
269. Bradley and Goldsmith insist that Sabbatino's federalism is dicta and that the
decision is really based on separation of powers concerns. Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 6, at 859-60. They miss the interconnection between the two. Underlying
the holding that the dictates of separation of powers bar the judiciary from meddling
in areas of international relations reserved to the executive branch, is an equally im-
portant holding that the states as well are barred from such meddling. Federalism
decrees that control over foreign affairs is assigned to the federal government; separa-
tion of powers determines how the three federal branches share that responsibility.
270. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 431 (1968).
271. Id. at 432.
272. Id. at 436. The Court cited a series of state cases in which similar provisions
were used to justify denying inheritance rights to citizens of countries considered un-
friendly to the United States. Id. at 435 n.6, 436,437 n.8, 438-40. One California judge
was quoted as saying, "No, I won't send any money to Russia," taking "judicial notice
that Russia kicks the United States in the teeth all the time." Id. at 437 n.8.
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gives way to the federal government's paramount control over foreign
affairs.2 73
Even where the Court has found an area to be within the powers of
the state to regulate, foreign affairs implications have sufficed to af-
ford federal jurisdiction. In Skiriotes v. Florida,74 for example, the
Court reviewed a state court criminal conviction for a violation of a
state statute prohibiting the use of diving equipment to harvest
sponges within three nautical miles of the Florida coast. Supreme
Court jurisdiction over the appeal rested on the claim that Florida had
exceeded its powers by regulating conduct occurring outside the
state's territorial waters. The Court upheld the Florida statute after
finding that it did not conflict with international law.
Federal control over international relations continues to justify for-
eign affairs as one of the "few and restricted" areas in which the
courts are authorized to formulate federal common law.2 75
There is, of course, no "federal general common law." Neverthe-
less, the Court has recognized the need and authority in some lim-
ited areas to formulate what has come to be known as "federal
common law." These instances are "few and restricted," and fall
into essentially two categories: those in which a federal rule of deci-
sion is "necessary to protect uniquely federal interests," and those
in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop sub-
stantive law.
2 76
The concededly narrow field in which development of federal com-
mon law is authorized includes "international disputes implicating...
our relations with foreign nations., 27 7 Foreign affairs constitute an
"enclave" in which such law making is permitted. 8
273. Id. at 440-41. The Court held that state regulations governing the distribution
of estates "must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign
policy," whether or not the underlying concerns are governed by treaty. Id. "If there
are to be such restraints, they must be provided by the Federal Government." Id. at
441.
[T]he Oregon Legislature has framed its inheritance laws to the prejudice of
nations whose policies it disapproves and thus has trespassed upon an area
where the Constitution contemplates that only the National Government
shall operate .... [T]he conduct of our foreign affairs is entrusted under the
Constitution to the National Government, not to the probate courts of the
several States.
Id. at 442-43 (Stewart, J., concurring).
274. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
275. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981).
276. Id. (citations omitted).
277. Id. at 641. Others include disputes between states and admiralty. Id.
278. Judicial lawmaking in the area of foreign affairs does not raise the same feder-
alism questions as such lawmaking in other areas because, "[i]n these contexts, the
Constitution makes federal sovereignty exclusive and completely preempts state law,
thereby eliminating the federalism constraints .... Kramer, supra note 2, at 288 n.84.
The "widely accepted" middle ground of the federal common law debate recognizes
that federal court lawmaking power is limited, but maintains that it exists where au-
thorized by Congress or the Constitution and in "a limited number of enclaves" or
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The federal common law governing foreign affairs recognizes the
key role played by the political branches of the federal government.
Common law "is necessarily informed ... by articulated congressional
policies," as well as by international law principles.21 9 These two pil-
lars define the status of international law as federal law: Interpreta-
tion of international law norms is a federal question, and the views of
the legislature and the executive are to be afforded great weight in
determining the appropriate application of such norms.' Far from
contradictory, federalism and separation of powers mesh tightly, con-
firming that international law issues are governed by federal, not state
law, and that the political branches of the federal government play a
key role in interpreting such law.Z81
"areas of 'uniquely federal interest."' Brown, supra note 209, at 252-53 (quoting Boyle
v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988)).
279. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 623 (1983). In a dispute turning on whether to pierce the corporate veil of a
Cuban corporation, the Supreme Court found the issue governed by federal common
law and declined to apply New York or Cuban law. Id. at 621-22. Instead, the Court
applied the principle enunciated in Sabbatino, holding that "matters bearing on the
Nation's foreign relations 'should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state
interpretations."' Id at 622 n.11 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 425 (1964)). Citing once again The Paquete Habana's holding that interna-
tional law "is part of our law," the Court concluded that the case before it was gov-
erned by "principles... common to both international law and federal common law."
Id at 623. That common law, however, "is necessarily informed both by international
law principles and by articulated congressional policies." Id. Thus, the Court held
that cases raising international law issues are federal questions, governed by federal
common law. In addition, federal common law's incorporation of international law is
"informed" by federal policies articulated by the legislative branch. This conclusion
reflects the separation-of-powers concerns highlighted in Sabbatino. Foreign relations
issues are both federal questions and primarily assigned to the political branches;
therefore, although federal law governs, the judiciary should show deference to legis-
lative and executive interpretations of international law obligations. See supra note
273.
280. The result of this deference arguably reflects, at times, a marked willingness to
twist international law principles to protect U.S. government policies. See, for exam-
ple, Justice Blackmun's critique of the Supreme Court's decisions in United States V.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), and Sale v. Haitian Cts. Council, Inc., 509 U.S.
155 (1993), in which he concluded that the majority opinions -reflect a disturbing
disregard on the part of the Supreme Court of its obligations when construing interna-
tional law." Blackmun, supra note 7, at 45. The heart of these cases, nevertheless, is
the refusal to defer to international norms when evaluating statutes and executive
actions, not a rejection of either the federal status of such norms or their validity in
the absence of contrary political branch action. Lawrence Lessig's cursory citation of
such cases, all interpreting statutes and executive actions, thus does not support his
suggestion that recent Supreme Court opinions lend support to the Bradley and Gold-
smith critique of the modem position. Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volutne 110:
An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1785, 1811 & n.112
(1997).
281. In Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988), for example, the Court noted "that the
United States has a vital national interest in complying with international law." Id. at
323. Evaluating a local District of Columbia statute that limited the right to demon-
strate in the vicinity of a foreign embassy, the Court compared the D.C. statute to a
less restrictive provision enacted by Congress. Id. at 324-29. Noting that Congress -is
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C. Rehabilitating The Paquete Habana
At the time the Supreme Court wrote the now-famous Paquete Ha-
bana words, "international law is part of our law, ' 2 2 the federal
courts employed different categories of common law without clearly
distinguishing among them. The Swift v. Tyson regime generated gen-
eral common law, permitting the federal courts to undertake in-
dependent review of issues that otherwise fell within the control of
state law. The federal courts also applied a kind of supreme federal
common law in a handful of areas that clearly fell under national con-
trol, although the evolving federal-state judicial structure could not
explain or justify this emerging federal common law. Erie's clear divi-
sion between state and federal court lawmaking powers made possible
the development of "true" federal common law. In Sabbatino and
the body primarily responsible for implementing our obligations" in this area of inter-
national law, id. at 324, the Court relied upon the "congressional judgment" that the
D.C. statute was not the least restrictive means to protect foreign diplomats and thus
not required by international law. Id. at 329. As a result, the Court held that the local
statute violated constitutional free speech protections, reserving judgment on whether
international law could ever require adjusting the balancing of interests required by
the First Amendment "to accommodate the interests of foreign officials." Id. at 324.
In Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 U.S. 298 (1994),
the Court considered a challenge to a method of calculating taxes on foreign corpora-
tions that had prompted repeated complaints from foreign governments. One of the
questions raised by the case was whether the state statute impermissibly violated Con-
gress' constitutional control over foreign commerce by imposing a taxation scheme
that Congress had not explicitly authorized. Id. at 302-03. Did California's statute
interfere with the government's ability to speak with "one voice" in foreign affairs?
The Court found no interference with congressional foreign affairs powers because
Congress had implicitly authorized the taxation scheme by considering and rejecting
repeated attempts to prohibit such taxation. Id. at 324-47. Prior decisions, the Court
said, held that explicit authorization was not necessary. "Congress may more pas-
sively indicate that certain state practices do not 'impair federal uniformity in an area
where federal uniformity is essential."' Id. at 323 (quoting Japan Line Ltd. v. County
of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)). While reading the tea leaves of congres-
sional debates, reports, and rejected legislation is a convoluted means by which to
determine congressional intent, the Court nevertheless adhered to the basic principle
that, in areas touching upon foreign affairs and international law, deference is paid to
the political branches. Here, in an area delegated by the Constitution to Congress,
the implicit authorization of Congress is sufficient to validate the state practice.
See also Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993), in which the
Court acknowledged that international law might bar the assertion of jurisdiction over
foreign corporations where a conflict between U.S. and foreign law made it impossi-
ble to comply with both. Id. at 794-99. Finding no such conflict, the Court did not
consider whether it would decline to exercise jurisdiction where such a conflict did
exist. Id. at 799. The four-judge dissent, however, found that international law did bar
the assertion of jurisdiction. Id. at 812-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Applying the pre-
sumption of Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118, 2 Cranch 34, 67
(1804) (stating that, "[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains"), the dissent would have
held that Congress could not have intended to assert jurisdiction in this case, as such a
conclusion would violate international law. Hartford Ins., 509 U.S. at 815 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
282. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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later cases, the Supreme Court applied this new framework, clarifyring
that international law issues are governed by federal law, constituting
an area of federal concern over which federal courts have jurisdiction
and about which federal court decisions are binding on the states.
These Supreme Court decisions have assigned international law its
place on the federal side of the great post-Erie divide between federal
and state law.
What then is the precedential value of the holding of The Paquete
Habana with which we started this article? Written at a time when the
status of the general common law and the distinction between state
and federal common law were unclear, the opinion does not specify
the characteristics of the law of which international law forms a part.
Most federal common lawmaking fell within the general common law
rubric; but, by the end of the nineteenth century, the federal courts
had begun to develop true federal common law. Although they were
unable to label it as such under the prevailing legal theories, such law
was jurisdiction-granting and supreme over state law. The bare fact
that a federal court decision on common law grounds predated Erie
does not, by itself, indicate that it constituted state law; proper under-
standing of such law requires an analysis of the area of law and the
consequences intended by the Court.
Viewed in this larger context, it is clear that the Court in The Pa-
quete Habana did not mean that international law was state law. The
Supreme Court had regularly applied international law as federal
common law where appropriate, including disputes between states
and cases raising the act of state doctrine, the laws of prize, or other
admiralty cases. In each area, the common law developed by the
Supreme Court constituted a form of federal common law. The Pa-
quete Habana fits comfortably within this diverse set of cases. The
case concerned the laws of prize, specifically determining whether a
fishing boat belonging to a citizen of the enemy could be seized as a
prize of war. Such issues had long been viewed as governed by inter-
national law and as raising issues of federal, not state, law.
Finally, the modern import of the language in this ninety-seven-
year-old Supreme Court opinion depends not only on what the
Supreme Court intended when it wrote those now famous words, but
also on how succeeding generations of judges have understood and
applied those words in light of subsequent developments. Erie re-
wrote our concepts of federal and state common law. How have the
courts read the common law language in The Paquete Habana after
Erie?
On this the Supreme Court has led the way: The Court has cited
the language in The Paquete Habana as evidence that international
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law is part of federal law.283 This modem interpretation of the Pa-
quete Habana language is stated clearly and without reservation in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,2 4 discussed at length in part
III, in which the Court cited The Paquete Habana in support of the
proposition that "it is, of course, true that United States courts apply
international law as a part of our own in appropriate circumstances
... 285 Whether a particular case presents "appropriate circum-
stances" may be subject to considerable debate, but such questions are
without a doubt "federal." Sabbatino's holding on the issue is most
certainly not limited to the act of state doctrine and the separation of
powers issues triggered by that doctrine. To the contrary, the case
holds that federal law must govern "legal problems" affecting interna-
tional relations, in order to ensure that "rules of international law
should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state
interpretations. "286
Almost twenty years later, the Court again cited the same language
from The Paquete Habana for the same proposition, noting that "as
we have frequently reiterated," international law "'is part of our law
.... ,"'I87 The Court applied federal common law rules incorporating
both international law principles and "articulated congressional poli-
cies" to arrive at a federal, not state, resolution of a matter that
touched upon foreign affairs.288 Relying on and paraphrasing Sabba-
tino, the Court repeated that "matters bearing on the Nation's foreign
relations 'should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state
283. As Professor Henkin said ten years ago, "In the eighty-seven years since The
Paquete Habana, the Court repeatedly has emphasized that international law is the
law of the land, and it has given effect to principles of customary international law as
the law of the United States." Louis Henkin, The Constitution and U.S. Sovereignty:
A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev., 853, 873 (1987).
284. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
285. Id. at 423. The Court also cites for this holding The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 423,
9 Cranch 242, 263 (1815) (holding that, in the absence of statute directing otherwise,
"the court is bound by the law of nations, which is a part of the law of the land"); and
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) ("When the United States declared
their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state
of purity and refinement."). In Ware v. Hylton, Justice Wilson distinguished between
state and federal authority over matters implicating foreign affairs, concluding that
Virginia could not enforce a statute canceling debts owed to British citizens, although
Congress could have done so. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 281 ("Congress ... clearly
possessed the right of confiscation, as an incident of the powers of war and peace
286. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425.
287. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comerico Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 623 (1983).
288. Id.
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interpretations.'289 The lower federal courts have regularly cited The
Paquete Habana for this same proposition.3
The reliance on the Paquete holding by the Supreme Court and
lower courts has not been a product of a careless quote, ignoring the
pre-Erie context in which the case was decided. The Fildrrtiga'-t deci-
sion, for example, strongly criticized by Bradley and Goldsmith for
inappropriate reliance on The Paquete Habana, actually relies on a
broad range of sources for its conclusion that international law is a
part of federal common law. Fildrtiga begins with a review of the sta-
tus of international law at the time of the ratification of the Constitu-
tion, citing to evidence that the framers intended to assign control
over foreign affairs to the federal government and to afford federal
courts jurisdiction over cases raising issues of international law."g
Nineteenth century cases and The Paquete Habana are cited properly
to demonstrate the continuing commitment to and incorporation of
international law into the law of the United States. 93
Nor does the Fildrtiga approach conflict with that of the Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law.294 Both cite The Paquete Habana for
the proposition that international law is federal law .295 Both cite
289. Id. at 622 n.11; see also First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406
U.S. 759, 763 (1972) (plurality opinion) (citing The Paquete Habana for the proposi-
tion that international law is one of several applicable sources of law in federal court);
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73 (1941) (ambiguously citing The Paquete Ha-
bana for the proposition that "[i]nternational law is a part of our law and as such is
the law of all States of the Union"). Pre-Erie, the Court cited the same language in
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), to support its development of a federal com-
mon law of interstate relations. Id. at 97.
290. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1.
291. lr.l6tiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
292. Id. at 885-87.
293. Id. Bradley and Goldsmith also criticize Fildrtiga for failing to cite Bergman V.
De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948), a case applying international law as the law of
New York State. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 834; see supra note 243. Berg-
man, however, did not involve a federal statute instructing the federal courts to adju-
dicate violations of the law of nations. Moreover, any implication that international
law is governed by state law, not federal law, was overruled by Sabbatino. See supra
notes 278-82 & accompanying text.
294. Restatement (Third), supra note 7. Bradley and Goldsmith oversimplify both
the Fildrtiga decision and the Restatement. After reducing both arguments to one-
dimensional caricatures, they conclude that they are contradictory. Bradley & Gold-
smith, supra note 6, at 836-37. They claim that the Fildrtiga court -relied uncritically
on pre-Erie precedents" and "appeared not to understand that these precedents ap-
plied [customary international law] as general common law, not federal law." Id. at
834. Their criticism completely misses the long history of federal common law devel-
oped before the Erie decision.
295. Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 887; Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § I11 reporters'
notes 2,4. The Restatement (Third) analysis properly notes that The Paquete Habana
did not address the issue of the supremacy of customary international law over state
law, but that later cases did find it to be supreme. Id. § 111 reporters' note 2. The
holding in The Paquete Habana is also cited in support of the conclusion that
"[m]atters arising under customary international law also arise under 'the laws of the
United States'...." Id. § 111 reporters' note 4. Bradley and Goldsmith thus err in
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statements by John Jay to demonstrate the framers' intent to assign
issues of international law to the jurisdiction of the federal courts.296
The Restatement discusses the equivocal status of customary interna-
tional law during the period before Erie, an issue Fildrtiga had no
need to address, but does not thereby undercut the precedential value
of The Paquete Habana or any of the pre-Erie cases cited by Fildr-
tiga.297 Most important, both conclude at the same modem point, cit-
ing Sabbatino for the holding that post-Erie, customary international
law is federal law.298
The question of the post-Erie significance of cases decided pre-Erie
has arisen in other areas as well. As discussed earlier, the Supreme
Court reviewed pre-Erie cases deciding disputes between states over
borders and water rights and characterized the law applied in those
cases as federal common law. Similarly, the modern citations to The
Paquete Habana, coupled with the extensive analysis of Sabbatino,
make clear that the pre-Erie cases stand for the proposition that inter-
national law is part of federal common law-even if, in the era in
asserting that the Restatement completely rejects the precedential value of the pre-
Erie cases. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 836.
296. [E]ven before the Constitution, as the "United States were responsible to
foreign nations for the conduct of each State, relative to the laws of nations,
and the performance of treaties ... the inexpediency of referring all such
questions to State Courts, and particularly to the Courts of delinquent States
became apparent."
See Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 111 reporters' note 3 (quoting Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793)); Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (quoting The
Federalist No. 3 (John Jay), at 22 (1 Bourne ed., 1901) ("[U]nder the national govern-
ment, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be
expounded in one sense, and executed in the same manner; whereas adjudications on
the same points and questions, in thirteen states ... will not always accord or be
consistent.")).
297. See supra note 192 (discussing the Restatement's treatment of international
law pre-Erie).
298. The Restatement observes that international law is "like" federal common
law, but not that it "is" federal common law. Restatement (Third), supra note 7,
§ 111, cmt. d. The distinction accurately reflects both the deference paid to the views
of the executive branch in determining the content of international law and the fact
that international law is developed by the international community as a joint en-
deavor. See Henkin, supra note 18, at 137 n.* (noting that, in "finding" international
law, judges are bound to consider the authority of the executive branch and "attend to
the practices and opinions of many nation-states over many years"). Nevertheless,
this distinction is immaterial to the characterization of customary international law as
federal law, both supreme over state law and jurisdiction-granting. Restatement
(Third), supra note 7, § 111 reporters' note 4.
For these purposes, there is no reason to treat claims arising under interna-
tional law any differently from those arising under other federal law. In de-
termining international law, judges are less free in their "sources" and are
subject to international constraints ... but the law they find is "part of our
law" like other nonstatutory law and is properly treated like federal common
law.
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which they were written, such language and concepts could not have
been employed.
IV. IN DEFENSE OF THE MODERN POSITION
The modem position holds that customary international law is fed-
eral common law, both jurisdiction-granting and supreme over state
law. This position has been adhered to consistently by the federal
courts without causing demonstrable strains in the fabric of our consti-
tutional federalism or democracy.299 The exaggerated fear of interna-
299. Many of the modem cases applying customary international law as federal law
involve the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) [hereinafter -ATCA"],
which states, "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." Originally enacted as part of the First Judiciary Act, Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20 § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), the statute was rarely cited before 1980.
Randall, supra note 7, at 4-5 nn.15-17 (counting twenty-one cases asserting jurisdic-
tion under the statute, but only two sustaining the claim).
The ATCA vaulted into prominence with the decision in Fildrtiga, when the Second
Circuit sustained a claim by the family of a young man tortured to death in Paraguay
by a Paraguayan police officer. The court held that the statute permits suits by aliens
for violations of international law as it is understood today, as long as the court has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 887. For a detailed explanation of the
statute and the cases applying it, see Beth Stephens & Michael Ratner, International
Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts (1996). Since 1980, the Fildrtiga holding has
been confirmed by the Second Circuit, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996); Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Re-
public, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 488 U.S. 428 (1989); and
applied by several panels of the Ninth Circuit: Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d
789 (9th Cir. 1996); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 508 U.S. 972 (1993); by the Eleventh Circuit, Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d
844 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 96 (1996); and by various district courts,
see, eg., Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla.
1993); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987). on reconsideration
on other grounds 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
Congress recently enacted a similar statute, signed by President Bush, the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994), enacted as Pub. L No. 102-
256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) [hereinafter "TVPA"], which codified a cause of action for
citizens as well as aliens based on international law prohibitions against torture and
summary execution. The legislative reports accompanying the TVPA stress Congress'
approval of the Fildrtiga interpretation of the ATCA and clarify that the TVPA is
meant to strengthen and expand its reach. H.R. Rep. No. 102-367 (1992), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (describing the ATCA as "permit[ting] Federal district
courts to hear claims by aliens for torts committed 'in violation of the law of nations,'"
stating that the ATCA "has other important uses and should not be replaced" by the
TVPA, and noting that "[tihe Fildrtiga case has met with general approval."); S. Rep.
No. 102-249, at 4 (1992) (same). Congress explicitly based its constitutional power to
enact the TVPA on the premise that international law is part of the -law of the
United States" for the purposes of Article III jurisdiction and on Congress' authority
to "define and punish... Offenses against the Law of Nations," S. Rep. No. 102-249,
at 5.
The ATCA properly triggers the federal common law powers of the federal courts
as an express congressional instruction to resolve claims by aliens alleging torts in
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tional law expressed by authors such as Bradley and Goldsmith
reflects an inaccurate view of both the method by which customary
international law develops and the content of such law. This view
leads to the misplaced concern that foreign legal norms will be im-
posed by the courts without a democratic process.30 0
Customary international law is the product of a deliberative interac-
tion among the nations of the world.30' The process is far faster now
than two centuries ago, given the phenomenal growth of multinational
organizations and communication advances that permit information to
be exchanged virtually instantaneously, rather than arriving by boat
after weeks or months, if at all. 30  Nevertheless, the involvement of
almost 200 nations30 3 in the process guarantees that regardless of the
communication advances of the information superhighway, consensus
will rarely be quick or easy? °4
violation of the law of nations. Even were the modem position to fail, the statute
would survive as a congressional authorization to the federal courts to develop the
common law necessary to decide such cases. See Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks,
Fildrtiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66
Fordham L. Rev. 463, 513 (1997).
In their article in this volume of the Fordham Law Review, Bradley and Goldsmith
sketch new questions about the Fildrtiga interpretation of the Alien Tort Claims Act
and its relation to the Torture Victim Protection Act. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 201, at 356-57 (1997). Although a full response to their novel argument is be-
yond the scope of this article, it suffices to say that their extreme positivist view of
federal court jurisdiction and common lawmaking powers leads them to an implausi-
bly narrow interpretation of the actions of both the eighteenth century Congress that
enacted the Alien Tort Claims Act and the twentieth century Congress that chose to
reaffirm it, with ringing language about this country's obligation to protect and en-
force human rights.
300. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 868 ("The modern position...
posits that unelected federal judges apply customary law made by the world commu-
nity at the expense of state prerogatives."); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of
Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 665, 721 (1986) ("[I]f customary in-
ternational law can be made by practice wholly outside the United States it has no
basis in popular sovereignty at all. Many foreign governments are not responsive to
their own people, let alone to the American people.").
301. A rule does not attain the status of customary international law unless it is
observed by a significant number of states out of a sense of legal obligation. Restate-
ment (Third), supra note 7, § 102(2); Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International
Law 4-11 (4th ed. 1990); Janis, supra note 26, at 35-46.
302. See, e.g., Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 102 reporters' note 2 (noting
that passage of an extended period of time is no longer deemed necessary for the
establishment of a customary international law norm, "perhaps because improved
communications made the practice of states widely and quickly known"); Blum &
Steinhardt, supra note 7, at 72 ("The essence of the new modes of lawmaking is that
they accelerate the process of customary law formation by relying upon the unique
form of state practice which occurs in multilateral organizations like the United
Nations.").
303. At last count, the international community included 192 nations. The World
Almanac and Book of Facts 1997 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1996).
304. Bradley and Goldsmith and I all agree that "[clustomary international law is a
developing concept." Beth Stephens, Litigating Customary International Human
Rights Norms, 25 Ga. J. Int'l Comp. L. 191, 198 (1995-96). Part of such development,
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This slow and cumbersome process has produced an extremely
short list of customary international law norms. The Restatement
(Third) lists seven human fights prohibitions, including genocide, slav-
ery, murder, and torture." 5 Not surprisingly, none are controversial
in the United States.3°6 The difficulty involved in reaching worldwide
consensus ensures that binding norms of customary international law
will reflect only the most basic, noncontroversial international rules of
conduct. Advocates of stronger human rights protections urge expan-
sion of the short list.30 7 Arguments in support of the inclusion of doz-
of course, entails recognition of new norms, id. at 199, although such a process is not
nearly as fast as victims of human rights abuses would prefer. Neither is it the uncon-
trollable evil portrayed by Bradley and Goldsmith.
305. Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 702. The full list includes genocide; slav-
ery or the slave trade; murder or causing disappearance; torture or other cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment; prolonged arbitrary detention; systematic racial
discrimination; and "a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights." Id.
306. Aiston and Simma suggest that the Restatement's analysis is -suspiciously
convenient" and may reflect "sub-conscious chauvinism." Bruno Simma and Philip
Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Princi-
ples, 12 Austl. Y.B. Int'l L. 82, 95 (1992).
The great majority of rights considered important under U.S. law, as well as
virtually every right which recent U.S. governments have been prepared to
criticize other governments for violating, are held to be part of customary
international law. By contrast, none of the rights which the U.S. fails to
recognise in its domestic law, is included.
Id- The criticism is somewhat off target, given that the Restatement purports only to
be a "restatement" of the foreign relations law of the United States. The observation
that the Restatement closely mirrors U.S. domestic law, however, does indicate that
the United States has generally accepted only those international rules that mesh
neatly with our own law-an observation that troubles strong advocates of the rule of
international law, but that should provide comfort to those worried about the impact
of such law on our domestic legal system.
307. That the list of customary international human rights norms is subject to modi-
fication and expansion is self-evident. As the nations of the world come to a consen-
sus on basic human rights, more and more of those rights will reach the level of
customary international law. The Restatement (Third) states that the list -is not nec-
essarily complete, and is not closed: human rights not listed in this section may have
achieved the status of customary law, and some rights might achieve that status in the
future." Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 702 cmt. a.
A sampling of the rights proposed for inclusion over the past decade includes edu-
cation, see Connie de la Vega, The Right to Equal Education: Merely a Guiding Prin-
ciple or Customary International Legal Right?, 11 Harv. Blackletter J. 37 (1994);
environmental harm, see Michelle Leighton Schwartz, International Legal Protections
for Victims of Environmental Abuse, 18 Yale J. Int'l L. 355 (1993); gender discrimina-
tion and gender violence, see Charlotte Bunch, Wonen's Rights as Human Rights:
Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights, 12 Hum. Rts. Q. 486 (1990); housing, see Marc-
Olivier Herman, Fighting Homelessness: Can International Human Rights Law Make
a Difference?, 2 Geo. J. on Fighting Poverty 59 (1994); indigenous rights, see S. James
Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary International Law, 8 No. 2 Ariz. J.
Int'l & Comp. L. 1 (1991); the juvenile death penalty, see Julian S. Nicholls, Too
Young to Die: International Law and the Imposition of the Juvenile Death Penalty in
the United States, 5 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 617 (1991); labor rights, see Leslie Deak,
Customary International Labor Laws and Their Application in Hungary, Poland, and
the Czech Republic, 2 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 1 (1994); right to defense counsel, see
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ens of new norms have been advanced over the past decade. For
better or worse, however, such debates are still mired at the theoreti-
cal level. Despite human rights advocates' best efforts, the built-in
barriers to rapid development of a consensus on human rights protec-
tions ensure slow, incremental movement toward recognition of new
norms.
The United States has played an increasingly important role in the
development of customary international law over the past fifty years,
first as one of the two superpowers, now as the only one. As the law
of the sea evolved over the course of this century, for example, the
United States played an active role, blocking disfavored rules and ob-
taining acceptance of others.30 8
In another field, the executive branch has recognized that many
provisions of the laws of war are binding on the United States as cus-
tomary international law, even where the United States has not rati-
fied the relevant treaties. For example, although the United States
has not ratified the Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, 30 9 the gov-
ernment considers some of the Protocols' provisions to be binding as
customary international law norms.3 a° The Reagan administration's
approach to the Protocols is illustrative. Having decided not to sign
Protocol I due to disagreement over certain key provisions, the execu-
tive branch undertook a careful review of which of its provisions were
nonetheless binding on this country as customary international law. A
Department of State attorney observed at the time, "This question is
not an academic one, but has considerable practical importance," be-
cause the United States would consider itself legally bound by those
Martin Flaherty, Human Rights Violations Against Defense Lawyers: The Case of
Northern Ireland, 7 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 87 (1994); and sexual orientation, see James D.
Wilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation, 18 Hastings Int'l &
Comp. L. Rev. 1 (1994).
308. See Restatement (Third), supra note 7, pt. V, introductory note (summarizing
U.S. recognition of customary law rules governing aspects of the law of the sea);
Jonathan I. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States Govern-
ment to Violate Customary International Law, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 913, 915-16 (1986);
Henkin, supra note 7, at 1564 n.34; Henry M. Arruda, Comment, The Extension of the
United States Territorial Sea: Reasons and Effects, 4 Conn. J. Int'l L. 697 (1989) (de-
tailing the history of international and U.S. positions as to sovereignty over coastal
waters and control over undersea resources). The United States' concept of coastal
state economic rights over the continental shelf, announced in 1945, was so quickly
accepted as customary international law binding on all states that it has been cited as
an example of "instant customary law." Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 102 re-
porters' note 2.
309. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)
adopted by the Conference on 8 June 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
310. See Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Cus-
tomary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 2 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 419 (1987) (discussing the Reagan adminis-
tration's analysis determining which of the Protocols' many provisions constitute
norms of customary international law, binding on the United States).
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rules that reflected customary international law.3"' Clarity as to which
rules were binding was necessary to guide U.S. military commanders,
as well as U.S. allies.
In practice, customary international law thus fits comfortably within
the U.S. legal system. As illustrated by these examples, the executive
branch participates in the formation of customary norms, sifts through
emerging norms, and offers guidance as to which norms have reached
binding status.312 Federal courts asked to enforce international norms
draw upon the expertise of the executive branch, as well as interna-
tional sources and the opinions of scholars. The suggestion that the
United States could suddenly find federal courts imposing a new norm
upon the states is inconsistent with the reality of both the interna-
tional law process and that of the United States.
Given the tremendous clout of the United States in the interna-
tional arena, complaints that international law is imposed on this
country ring false. Consider for a moment the small, impoverished
nations around the world who are unable to send representatives to
many of the international meetings at which international law princi-
ples are debated and developed, much less to engage in the behind-
the-scenes negotiations at which deals and tradeoffs are struck. Com-
pare the position of the United States, a nation with a government
working overtime to influence and direct international law discus-
sions. Now imagine the reaction of a citizen of one of those less pow-
erful nations when presented with a complaint from U.S. citizens that
international law does not represent their views. Such whining from
the dominant force in world affairs lacks credibility and fails to reflect
the process by which customary international law norms develop.313
It is true that the United States occasionally loses on such issues,
despite its clout. But U.S. citizens can be confident that their views
have been fully aired and that their government is deeply involved in
developments of importance to this country. That the result might on
rare occasions be disappointing does not make the process less demo-
cratic, because minority views usually lose in a democratic process. In
311. Id at 419.
312. "[I]t is the executive branch, far more than the courts, that acts for the United
States to help legislate customary international law." Henkin, supra note 7, at 1562.
Bradley and Goldsmith repeatedly characterize customary international law as judge-
made law. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 201, at 329-31 (arguing that federal
courts "impose" customary international law). They ignore the role of the executive
branch, the representative of the United States government in the international arena,
in the formation of such law and in the decision whether it is binding on the United
States. Id. at 345 (alleging the "judicial federalization of [customary international law]
without political branch authorization").
313. Brilmayer points out that when U.S. courts assert jurisdiction over citizens of
other countries, a concern for democracy would point toward application of interna-
tional law rather than U.S. law, because those outside the United States have an op-
portunity to participate in the creation of international norms, but not U.S. law.
Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 311.
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the area of customary international law, however, each country has a
powerful individual veto in that customary international law norms do
not bind states that have objected to the rule during its formation.314
Thus, if dissatisfied with an emerging norm of international law, the
United States can register an objection and block the rule from apply-
ing to this country. Moreover, given the relatively weak placement of
common law in the hierarchy of federal law sources, federal courts
have declined to enforce international law in the face of conflicting
congressional or executive instructions, whether articulated through
statute, executive order, or treaty.315 Thus, even if a norm were to
attain customary international law status, binding on the United
States, the federal courts would not enforce it if either the executive
or legislative branches disagreed.316 Enforcement of norms that the
United States, a full participant in the international law community,
has willingly become bound by, poses no threat to democracy. 317
International law does address topics at one time considered do-
mestic, most importantly, a State's treatment of its own citizens. But
it is important to understand the full international implications of this,
before challenging the enforcement of such norms within the United
States. The fifty years since World War II have seen a dramatic ex-
pansion of international human rights norms.3 18 Fundamental to this
314. See Restatement (Third), supra note 7, pt. I, ch. 1, introductory note, at 18,
§§ 102 cmt. d, 111 cmt. b (stating that a State is not bound by a customary interna-
tional law norm if it objects to the norm during the its formation).
315. See cases cited supra note 24. Thus, as Professor Neuman has explained, the
modern position calls for the enforcement of customary international law by federal
courts as a kind of default rule, following "a practice of presumptive enforceability of
customary international law," where international and U.S. sources-including state-
ments of the executive and legislative branches-indicate that a norm has become
binding on the United States, and the political branches have not said otherwise. See
Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense about Customary International Law: A Re-
sponse to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 371, 384, 386-87
(1997).
316. One suspects that a major unstated concern of those worried about the imposi-
tion of international law norms is that one U.S. administration might intentionally or
unwittingly allow a customary norm to attain binding status without objecting; the
United States would then be bound by the rule despite later objections. Federal
courts, however, would not follow such a norm if either of the political branches ob-
jected to its imposition. Had the Carter Administration, for example, consented to
the binding status of a rule barring the death penalty, later administrations or Con-
gress could have stated their opposition to the norm, instructing the courts to disobey
it. Although such a retroactive withdrawal would have had no effect on the United
States' international obligations, the executive or congressional action would have ef-
fectively barred domestic application of the otherwise valid customary rule in the
United States.
317. In the words of Justice O'Connor, "[O]ur status as a free nation demands
faithful compliance with the law of free nations." Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalism
of Free Nations, 28 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 35, 42 (1995-96).
318. Important human rights documents include, for example, A Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force for the United States
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development was the resounding assertion that individuals could be
held accountable by the international community for acts that were
tolerated or even mandated by their government. As expressed at the
Nuremberg proceedings, "The very essence of the [Nuremberg] Char-
ter is that individuals have international duties which transcend the
national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state.- 319
The United States championed this notion of international accounta-
bility after World War II and has strongly reaffirmed this position over
the past several years through the International Tribunals for Yugosla-
via and Rwanda.32 °
International accountability signifies that a U.S. citizen who violates
a fundamental international norm-by committing genocide, for ex-
ample, or a war crime-could be prosecuted as a criminal by an inter-
national tribunal even if the U.S. government had sanctioned or
ordered the criminal acts. The government as well could be held lia-
ble for such crimes under the current version of a draft Convention on
state responsibility under negotiation at the United Nations.321 Thus,
the shifting of power feared by Bradley and Goldsmith has long since
occurred; the federal government has the authority to consent to both
Feb. 23, 1989); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art.
2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force for the United States Sept. 8,
1992); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1984), 23 I.L.M. 1027 and 24 I.LM. 535 (entered into force for the
United States Nov. 20, 1994).
319. 1 International Military Tribunal, The Trial of German Major War Criminals
223 (1946). See generally Lobel, supra note 22, at 1135 (discussing the effect of the
Nuremburg Trials on human rights doctrine).
320. The Tribunal for Yugoslavia was established in May 1993. S.C. Res. 827, May
25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1203; see James C. O'Brien, The International Tribunal for Viola-
tions of International Hunanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 Am. J. Int'l L
639 (1993). The Tribunal for Rwanda was established in November 1994. S.C. Res.
955, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598; see Payam Akhavan, Current Developments: The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punish-
ment, 90 Am. J. Int'l L. 501 (1996). The tribunals base their jurisdiction on customary
international law, as well as conventions ratified by the governments of the accused.
321. According to the draft under discussion by the International Law Commission,
a state could be held responsible for an "international crime" if it breaches "an inter-
national obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the in-
ternational community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a
whole." Draft Articles on State Responsibility, in Report of the International Law
Commission, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 19, § 2, U.N. Doc. A/51/10
(1996). International crimes include aggression; interference with the right to self-
determination; widespread human rights violations such as slavery, genocide, and
apartheid; and "massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas." Id. at art. 19, § 3.
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conventional and customary norms that fundamentally impact on the
behavior of U.S. citizens by subjecting them to the possibility of pun-
ishment by an international tribunal.322 The federal goverment has
exercised this power over the past fifty years, working in collaboration
with the international community to define abuses that are beyond the
pale, that trigger criminal penalties even if mandated by a legitimate
government-even our own.
This expansion of areas addressed by international law reflects an
international consensus, joined in and championed by the United
States, that issues once considered of purely domestic concern are in
fact of great importance to the international community.32 3 Genocide,
war crimes, and torture are but some of the human rights violations
now prohibited by international law. Given their international im-
port, their prohibition and regulation falls within the authority of the
federal government, not the states.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent attacks on the status of international law as federal common
law are based on an incomplete review of history, a mistaken interpre-
tation of recent Supreme Court decisions, and a skewed view of inter-
national law and the enormously positive role international norms
play in our country and the world. The conclusion that customary in-
ternational law constitutes federal law is supported by early constitu-
tional history and has been firmly upheld by modern Supreme Court
rulings. It fits comfortably within the framework defining the proper
role of the common law in the federal courts.
322. The change in the content of the norms does not presuppose a less active role
for the U.S. government in their development and in the decision whether to allow
such norms to become binding on this country. This view of the changing nature of
customary international law as eliminating the "implied consent" of the United States
and other governments leads commentators such as Lessig to give undue credence to
Bradley and Goldsmith's claim that judges impose a "political" judgment when they
enforce such law. See Lessig, supra note 280, at 1797.
323. See Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution 150 (2d ed. 1996)
("International concern for human rights has made a state's respect for the rights of
its inhabitants a subject of international law and international politics, therefore a
concern of U.S. foreign policy."); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context
of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent
Protections in National Constitutions, 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 235, 238 (1993) (re-
ferring to the "vast array" of international treaties and customary norms that "pene-
trate into areas that in the past have been deemed to be wholly within the realm of
domestic law" (footnotes omitted)).
The U.S. State Department has long acknowledged the foreign policy implications
of human rights, issuing yearly human rights reports on countries around the world.
See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, issued
yearly since 1961, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1993), which instructs the Secretary
of State to transmit to Congress "a full and complete report... with respect to prac-
tices regarding the observance of and respect for internationally recognized human
rights in each country" slated to receive military security assistance. 22 U.S.C.
§ 2304(b).
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Far from a naked emperor, the modern position is a modestly
clothed, well-traveled yeoman of our federal-state division of author-
ity, and the fabric used to make his clothes is woven from some of the
most ancient and venerated threads of our constitutional history.
Notes & Observations
